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| | *Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union'' | | *Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union'' |
| | *Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''. See [http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm details]</ref> | | *Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''. See [http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm details]</ref> |
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| | Although the president and his brother Robert Kennedy (1925–68), the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901–87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]]. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing. | | Although the president and his brother Robert Kennedy (1925–68), the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901–87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]]. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing. |
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| | [[Image:Cuba62b.jpg|thumb|300px|Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962]] | | [[Image:Cuba62b.jpg|thumb|300px|Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962]] |
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| − | High-altitude [[U-2]] aircraft flown by the [[United States Air Force]], took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group. They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. Although the president and his brother [[Robert Kennedy]], the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901–87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]]. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing. | + | High-altitude [[U-2]] aircraft flown by the [[United States Air Force]], took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group. They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. |
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| | The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.<ref>Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 96</ref> | | The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.<ref>Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 96</ref> |