Changes

Following the death of Communist leader [[Konstantin Chernenko]] in 1985, Gorbachev was elected General Secretary.<ref>https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9037405/Mikhail-Gorbachev</ref> As General Secretary, Gorbachev improved relations with the [[United States]] and embarked on an extensive mission of attempying to reform the Communist Soviet Union under policies known as ''[[glasnost]]'' ("openness") and ''[[perestroika]]'' ("restructuring"). It is questioned to what extent he intended to bring about the wholesale changes that swept the Soviet Union and its satellites and how much events moved out of control.

Following the death of Communist leader [[Konstantin Chernenko]] in 1985, Gorbachev was elected General Secretary.<ref>https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9037405/Mikhail-Gorbachev</ref> As General Secretary, Gorbachev improved relations with the [[United States]] and embarked on an extensive mission of attempying to reform the Communist Soviet Union under policies known as ''[[glasnost]]'' ("openness") and ''[[perestroika]]'' ("restructuring"). It is questioned to what extent he intended to bring about the wholesale changes that swept the Soviet Union and its satellites and how much events moved out of control.

According to declassified CIA documents, [[George Soros]] targeted the Soviet government as early as 1987. Soros worked closely with a CIA linked non-governmental organization, the Institute for East-West Security Studies, to take advantage of Glasnost and Perestroika for the purpose of infiltrating and sabotaging the Soviet economic and political system. <ref>https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/12/09/soros-and-his-cia-friends-targeted-ussr-russia-1987/</ref>

According to declassified CIA documents, [[George Soros]] targeted the Soviet government as early as 1987. Soros worked closely with a CIA linked non-governmental organization, the Institute for East-West Security Studies, to take advantage of Glasnost and Perestroika for the purpose of infiltrating and sabotaging the Soviet economic and political system.<ref>https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/12/09/soros-and-his-cia-friends-targeted-ussr-russia-1987/</ref>

===Chernobyl===

===Chernobyl===

The [[East German Republic]] had been a member of the [[Warsaw Pact]]. With the [[Fall of the Berlin Wall]], discussions on German unification ensued.  Gorbachev was willing to allow the former Esat German Republic to leave the Warsaw Pact and become part of NATO in a united Germany, under condition that NATO would not expand eastward beyond the German-Polich border (Oder-Neise Line). Gorbachev ultimately agreed to a proposal from then U.S. Secretary of State [[James Baker (DOS)]] that NATO would not move “one inch” beyond the Oder-Neise Line.

The [[East German Republic]] had been a member of the [[Warsaw Pact]]. With the [[Fall of the Berlin Wall]], discussions on German unification ensued.  Gorbachev was willing to allow the former Esat German Republic to leave the Warsaw Pact and become part of NATO in a united Germany, under condition that NATO would not expand eastward beyond the German-Polich border (Oder-Neise Line). Gorbachev ultimately agreed to a proposal from then U.S. Secretary of State [[James Baker (DOS)]] that NATO would not move “one inch” beyond the Oder-Neise Line.

On Feb. 9, 1990, Baker said: “We consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should give a guarantee that the reunification of Germany will not lead to the enlargement of NATO’s military organization to the East.” On the next day, then German Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] said: “We consider that NATO should not enlarge its sphere of activity.”<ref>https://consortiumnews.com/2022/01/28/the-tangled-tale-of-nato-expansion-at-the-heart-of-ukraine-crisis/</ref>  Gorbachev’s mistake was not to get it in writing as a legally-binding agreement.<ref>For years it was believed there was no written record of the Baker-Gorbachev exchange at all, until the National Security Archive at George Washington University in December 2017 published a series of memos and cables about these assurances against NATO expansion eastward.</ref>

On Feb. 9, 1990, Baker said: “We consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should give a guarantee that the reunification of Germany will not lead to the enlargement of NATO’s military organization to the East.” On the next day, then German Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] said: “We consider that NATO should not enlarge its sphere of activity.”<ref>https://consortiumnews.com/2022/01/28/the-tangled-tale-of-nato-expansion-at-the-heart-of-ukraine-crisis/</ref>  Gorbachev's mistake was not to get it in writing as a legally-binding agreement.<ref>For years it was believed there was no written record of the Baker-Gorbachev exchange at all, until the National Security Archive at George Washington University in December 2017 published a series of memos and cables about these assurances against NATO expansion eastward.</ref>

[[File:Schifrinson.PNG|right|350px|thumb|Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed to collapsing the Soviet Union in exchange for a non-NATO expansion pledge. In 2021 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg denied such agreements ever existed or discussions even took place.<ref>https://www.rt.com/russia/544257-nato-boss-expansion-proposals/</ref>]]

[[File:Schifrinson.PNG|right|350px|thumb|Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed to collapsing the Soviet Union in exchange for a non-NATO expansion pledge. In 2021 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg denied such agreements ever existed or discussions even took place.<ref>https://www.rt.com/russia/544257-nato-boss-expansion-proposals/</ref>]]

{{quotebox-float|“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous ‘not one inch eastward’ assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by [[Western]] leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents …

{{quotebox-float|“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous ‘not one inch eastward’ assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by [[Western]] leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents …

[[Category:Atheists]]

[[Category:Atheists]]

[[Category:Peace Makers]]

[[Category:Peace Makers]]

[[category:Chess Players]]

[[Category:Chess Players]]