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→Soviet Missiles in Cuba: Soviet military doctrine
Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying U-2. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>
Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying U-2. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>
==Soviet military doctrine==
In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in the America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was deleagated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.
In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Societ nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the Unite d States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analagous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analagous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analagous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.
==Further reading==
==Further reading==