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→Soviet military doctrine: more discussion
::Actually, its sounding like Kreuschev may have been overstepping his boundaries when he sent the message to Radio Moscow (Unless there was an agreement reached in the Soviet Government that I don't know about, which has a very probably chance, or some other unknown fact). The tricky thing is, we don't have as many sources from the USSR perspective as easily accessible as American ones. Again, very nice section! [[User:Mskreuz|Mskreuz]] 16:10, 8 June 2007 (EDT)
::Actually, its sounding like Kreuschev may have been overstepping his boundaries when he sent the message to Radio Moscow (Unless there was an agreement reached in the Soviet Government that I don't know about, which has a very probably chance, or some other unknown fact). The tricky thing is, we don't have as many sources from the USSR perspective as easily accessible as American ones. Again, very nice section! [[User:Mskreuz|Mskreuz]] 16:10, 8 June 2007 (EDT)
:::Khruschev was spokesmen for the collective Politburo; however, control of nuclear weapons was not in CPSU hands, which Khruschev represented on the Politiburo. It was in the Soviet military hands, a potent political force in the USSR, which had saved the Soviet Union in WWII. Their judgement in use of nuclear weapons use was final. They did not need to consult with the CPSU or KGB on use once collectively the Poltiburo had committed them to action.
:::And the situation is further dramatized by the fact that Soviet miltiary doctrine allowed for a deployment force outside the Soviet Union to be incommunicado with the Center. If the Commander felt threatened in his mission, it was his sole judgement to launch a nuclear attack. [[User:RobS|RobS]] 16:20, 8 June 2007 (EDT)