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| | ''Am. Chiropractic v. Trigon Healthcare'', 367 F.3d 212, 217-18, 224 (4th Cir. 2004) (the lawsuit asserted "that Trigon and the medical doctors and associations were engaged in a conspiracy that used Trigon's reimbursement policies and treatment guidelines to limit severely the flow of insurance dollars to chiropractors and steer those monies toward medical doctors. Trigon argues that no conspiracy exists, and that it implemented its coverage policies unilaterally based on market supply and demand. The district court agreed with Trigon, dismissing two counts of the complaint for failure to state a claim and disposing of the remaining counts by granting Trigon's motion for summary judgment. Although we apply different reasoning than the district court in some areas, we affirm its disposition of the case in favor of Trigon. ... [M]edical doctors, in their role as members of the peer review committee, had a unity of interest with the hospital: ensuring patient care. We believe that ''Oksanen'''s reasoning is not only instructive but persuasive here."). | | ''Am. Chiropractic v. Trigon Healthcare'', 367 F.3d 212, 217-18, 224 (4th Cir. 2004) (the lawsuit asserted "that Trigon and the medical doctors and associations were engaged in a conspiracy that used Trigon's reimbursement policies and treatment guidelines to limit severely the flow of insurance dollars to chiropractors and steer those monies toward medical doctors. Trigon argues that no conspiracy exists, and that it implemented its coverage policies unilaterally based on market supply and demand. The district court agreed with Trigon, dismissing two counts of the complaint for failure to state a claim and disposing of the remaining counts by granting Trigon's motion for summary judgment. Although we apply different reasoning than the district court in some areas, we affirm its disposition of the case in favor of Trigon. ... [M]edical doctors, in their role as members of the peer review committee, had a unity of interest with the hospital: ensuring patient care. We believe that ''Oksanen'''s reasoning is not only instructive but persuasive here."). |
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| − | ''[[American Needle v. NFL]]'', 560 U.S. 183 (2010) ([[Sherman Act]] ban applies when a conspiracy “joins together independent centers of decision making”)
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| | ''[[Austin v. McNamara]]'', 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992) (This precedent has been widely followed to exclude evidence of bad faith from lawsuits against hospitals for sham peer review. The [[Ninth Circuit]] affirmed a grant of summary judgment to the defendant hospital and doctors affiliated with it.) | | ''[[Austin v. McNamara]]'', 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992) (This precedent has been widely followed to exclude evidence of bad faith from lawsuits against hospitals for sham peer review. The [[Ninth Circuit]] affirmed a grant of summary judgment to the defendant hospital and doctors affiliated with it.) |
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| | ''[[BCB Anesthesia Care v. Passavant Memorial Area Hosp. Ass’n]]'', 36 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Although we hesitate to say that [a staffing decision at one hospital] . . . can never state an antitrust claim, we believe it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead some additional facts from which it can be inferred that the case falls within the ambit of the Sherman Act." ''Seglin v. Esau, supra''. [769 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir.1985)] Before we enlist this court in the micromanagement of the staffing arrangements at Passavant under the aegis of the antitrust laws, we need better reasons than the plaintiffs have given us."). | | ''[[BCB Anesthesia Care v. Passavant Memorial Area Hosp. Ass’n]]'', 36 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Although we hesitate to say that [a staffing decision at one hospital] . . . can never state an antitrust claim, we believe it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead some additional facts from which it can be inferred that the case falls within the ambit of the Sherman Act." ''Seglin v. Esau, supra''. [769 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir.1985)] Before we enlist this court in the micromanagement of the staffing arrangements at Passavant under the aegis of the antitrust laws, we need better reasons than the plaintiffs have given us."). |
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| − | ''[[Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.]]'', 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (general rule against a subsidiary being considered to have conspired with a parent corporation for the purposes of the [[Sherman Act]]).
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| | ''Gabaldoni v. Washington County. Hospital Ass'n'', 250 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment by the district court in a lawsuit challenging a termination of a physician's clinical privileges and denied his application for reappointment to the medical staff, in a lawsuit contract and tort claims against hospital entities; there were no [[antitrust]] or [[Sherman Act]] claims in this case). | | ''Gabaldoni v. Washington County. Hospital Ass'n'', 250 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment by the district court in a lawsuit challenging a termination of a physician's clinical privileges and denied his application for reappointment to the medical staff, in a lawsuit contract and tort claims against hospital entities; there were no [[antitrust]] or [[Sherman Act]] claims in this case). |
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| | ''Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp.'', 87 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirmed summary judgment under [[HCQIA]] immunity on a Sherman Act Section 1 claim because the plaintiff-physician did not provide evidence of a concerted action and an antitrust injury) | | ''Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp.'', 87 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirmed summary judgment under [[HCQIA]] immunity on a Sherman Act Section 1 claim because the plaintiff-physician did not provide evidence of a concerted action and an antitrust injury) |
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| − | ''Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.'', 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (affirming a jury verdict in a price-fixing case under [[Sherman_Antitrust_Act#Section_One|Section 1]] of the [[Sherman Act]]).
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| | Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hosp., 560 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009) | | Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hosp., 560 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009) |
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| | ''Wieters v. Roper Hosp.'', 58 Fed. App’x 40, 41, 46 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The district court granted summary judgment to the hospital on immunity grounds, and we affirm. ... Although [the physician] has pointed out parts of the process that did not hew strictly to the bylaws and the safe harbor provisions, he has presented nothing that would lead a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the hospital treated him unfairly under the circumstances.”). | | ''Wieters v. Roper Hosp.'', 58 Fed. App’x 40, 41, 46 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The district court granted summary judgment to the hospital on immunity grounds, and we affirm. ... Although [the physician] has pointed out parts of the process that did not hew strictly to the bylaws and the safe harbor provisions, he has presented nothing that would lead a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the hospital treated him unfairly under the circumstances.”). |
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| | + | == Non-hospital antitrust cases == |
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| | + | ''[[American Needle v. NFL]]'', 560 U.S. 183 (2010) ([[Sherman Act]] ban applies when a conspiracy “joins together independent centers of decision making”). |
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| | + | ''[[Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.]]'', 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (general rule against a subsidiary being considered to have conspired with a parent corporation for the purposes of the [[Sherman Act]]). |
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| | + | ''Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.'', 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (affirming a jury verdict in a price-fixing case under [[Sherman_Antitrust_Act#Section_One|Section 1]] of the [[Sherman Act]]). |
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| | == Procedure == | | == Procedure == |