Changes

::*[[DNI]] held back the the findings of FISA Judge James Boasberg that strongly criticized the FISA-702 process for a year.  The Judge Boasberg report was written in September of 2018 but not released (redacted) until last month.

::*[[DNI]] held back the the findings of FISA Judge James Boasberg that strongly criticized the FISA-702 process for a year.  The Judge Boasberg report was written in September of 2018 but not released (redacted) until last month.

::*FISA Court judges Rosemary Collyer (declassified 2017) and James Boasberg (declassified 2019) both identified issues with the NSA database being exploited for unauthorized reasons.

::*FISA Court judges Rosemary Collyer (declassified 2017) and James Boasberg (declassified 2019) both identified issues with the NSA database being exploited for unauthorized reasons.

::*With the Boasberg report there is a lot of information that shows a continuum of database activity that did not stop after Collyer’s warnings, and the NSA promises. It seems, the political exploitation continues; Boasberg notes the “about” query option that NSA Director Mike Rogers halted, technically didn’t stop. Instead operators used the “to and from” option almost identically as the “about” queries for downstream data review and extraction. The FISA Appellate Court appointed ''amici curiae'' to review Boasberg’s opinion and reconcile counter claims by the FBI. Boasberg was never satisfied despite the FISC-R amicus assurances.<ref>https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISCR_Opinion_12Jul19.pdf</ref> His opinion reflects valid judicial cynicism within his reluctant re-authorization.

::*With the Boasberg report there is a lot of information that shows a continuum of database activity that did not stop after Collyer’s warnings, and the NSA promises. It seems, the political exploitation continues; [[Boasberg]] notes the “about” query option that NSA Director Mike Rogers halted, technically didn’t stop. Instead operators used the “to and from” option almost identically as the “about” queries for downstream data review and extraction. The FISA Appellate Court appointed ''amici curiae'' to review Boasberg’s opinion and reconcile counter claims by the FBI. Boasberg was never satisfied despite the FISC-R amicus assurances.<ref>https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISCR_Opinion_12Jul19.pdf</ref> His opinion reflects valid judicial cynicism within his reluctant re-authorization.

:*investigating the ''[[Steele dossier]]'' made the 2017 Mueller investigation an extension of a 2016 counterintelligence investigation and not a criminal investigation (later, those were spun off).  By maintaining the counterintelligence process for Mueller, the FBI was able to continue exploiting the NSA database as a FISA(702) tool for their investigation. The foreign actors played a key role in this process. So long as the [[Mueller investigation]] was targeting foreign actors they could collect downstream evidence on the “702” (American persons) returns.  In essence, the “small group” could stretch the NSA database rules to conduct electronic warrantless searches and massive electronic surveillance on targets direct (“to/from”) and indirect (downstream).

:*investigating the ''[[Steele dossier]]'' made the 2017 Mueller investigation an extension of a 2016 counterintelligence investigation and not a criminal investigation (later, those were spun off).  By maintaining the counterintelligence process for Mueller, the FBI was able to continue exploiting the NSA database as a FISA(702) tool for their investigation. The foreign actors played a key role in this process. So long as the [[Mueller investigation]] was targeting foreign actors they could collect downstream evidence on the “702” (American persons) returns.  In essence, the “small group” could stretch the NSA database rules to conduct electronic warrantless searches and massive electronic surveillance on targets direct (“to/from”) and indirect (downstream).

:*The violations that Boasberg is identifying (March 2017 through March 2018) must also include FISA database searches conducted by Mueller’s FBI team. It is all within the same system of electronic surveillance. The pattern, frequency and specifics of the Boasberg report are identical to the 2017 Rosemary Collyer report. Same violations. Same processes.

:*The violations that Boasberg is identifying (March 2017 through March 2018) must also include FISA database searches conducted by Mueller’s FBI team. It is all within the same system of electronic surveillance. The pattern, frequency and specifics of the Boasberg report are identical to the 2017 Rosemary Collyer report. Same violations. Same processes.