The [[Supreme Court of the United States]] greatly expanded the reach of the clause in [[Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States]]. The majority opinion cited Caminetti v. United States, which deemed that the interstate travel of passengers could be regulated as interstate commerce, and [[McCulloch v. Maryland]], amongst others, to conclude that "[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=379&page=241|work=Supreme Court of the United States|publisher=FindLaw|author=Justice [[Tom Clark]]|language=English|accessdate=May 2, 2009|date=Dec 14 1964|title=ATLANTA MOTEL V. UNITED STATES, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)}}</ref> | The [[Supreme Court of the United States]] greatly expanded the reach of the clause in [[Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States]]. The majority opinion cited Caminetti v. United States, which deemed that the interstate travel of passengers could be regulated as interstate commerce, and [[McCulloch v. Maryland]], amongst others, to conclude that "[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=379&page=241|work=Supreme Court of the United States|publisher=FindLaw|author=Justice [[Tom Clark]]|language=English|accessdate=May 2, 2009|date=Dec 14 1964|title=ATLANTA MOTEL V. UNITED STATES, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)}}</ref> |