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| | On the Weapons and Strategy substack, Stephen Bryen wrote:<ref>[https://weapons.substack.com/p/what-to-expect-from-the-vilnius-nato What to Expect from the Vilnius NATO Summit], STEPHEN BRYEN, JUL 6, 2023.</ref> | | On the Weapons and Strategy substack, Stephen Bryen wrote:<ref>[https://weapons.substack.com/p/what-to-expect-from-the-vilnius-nato What to Expect from the Vilnius NATO Summit], STEPHEN BRYEN, JUL 6, 2023.</ref> |
| − | :"Part of the [[Western alliance|Western]] foundation for Ukraine's offensive was the introduction of modern technology on the battlefield, represented especially by the appearance of the [[Leopard 2|Leopard tank]]. Unfortunately for NATO, the Leopard tanks have not saved the day for Ukraine. So far, between 16 and 20 Leopards have been knocked out on the battlefield along with lots of other NATO-supplied armor including infantry fighting vehicles such as the [[Bradley Fighting Vehicle|US Bradley]] and mine clearing systems like the Finnish Leopard 2R HMBV and the German Wisent 1. | + | :"Part of the [[Western alliance|Western]] foundation for Ukraine's offensive was the introduction of modern technology on the battlefield, represented especially by the appearance of the [[Leopard 2|Leopard tank]]. Unfortunately for NATO, the Leopard tanks have not saved the day for Ukraine. So far, between 16 and 20 Leopards have been knocked out on the battlefield along with lots of other NATO-supplied armor including infantry fighting vehicles such as the US Bradley and mine clearing systems like the Finnish Leopard 2R HMBV and the German Wisent 1. |
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| − | :Leopard, along with the [[M1A1 Abrams|US Abrams main battle tank]], form the armor backbone of NATO's land defense. While the US and its allies have superior airpower, they have sparse and inadequate air defenses compared to what Russia can bring forward. That means that a land defense needs to stand up to Russian [[artillery]], attack [[helicopter]]s armed with missiles, lethal drones and air launched mines. | + | :"Leopard, along with the [[M1A1 Abrams|US Abrams main battle tank]], form the armor backbone of NATO's land defense. While the US and its allies have superior airpower, they have sparse and inadequate air defenses compared to what Russia can bring forward. That means that a land defense needs to stand up to Russian [[artillery]], attack [[helicopter]]s armed with missiles, lethal drones and air launched mines. |
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| − | :The failure of the Leopard in Ukraine represents a huge challenge for NATO and signals that the current NATO "tripwire" strategy may not work. Under the tripwire paradigm, the idea is that an initial Russian attack (most likely in the [[Baltic states]] because Russian forces are very close to [[Estonia] and [[Latvia]]) can be held for some days while the US ships heavy forces into Europe. But if the tripwire is illusory, then NATO is exposed to rapid Russian advances in Europe should an attack be launched. The bottom line is that NATO's [[strategy]] needs revision or, alternatively, that the Europeans and Russians work out a mutually acceptable security arrangement. It is exactly such an arrangement that Russia proposed to NATO in December, 2021 and which was rejected without discussion. | + | :"The failure of the Leopard in Ukraine represents a huge challenge for NATO and signals that the current NATO "tripwire" strategy may not work. Under the tripwire paradigm, the idea is that an initial Russian attack (most likely in the [[Baltic states]] because Russian forces are very close to [[Estonia] and [[Latvia]]) can be held for some days while the US ships heavy forces into Europe. But if the tripwire is illusory, then NATO is exposed to rapid Russian advances in Europe should an attack be launched. The bottom line is that NATO's [[strategy]] needs revision or, alternatively, that the Europeans and Russians work out a mutually acceptable security arrangement. It is exactly such an arrangement that Russia proposed to NATO in December, 2021 and which was rejected without discussion. |
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| − | :Now the [[ammunition]] cupboard is bare, even in the United States. The Russians are learning how to counter advanced western systems, a negative development for NATO's security. It could not be a worse time to risk Europe's security on the basis of being able to stop a Russian attack. It may be easy for [[British]] [[politician]]s to scream they want NATO to fight in Ukraine, but it isn't [[London]] that is likely the first target of Russia's missiles. Cracks in the alliance are emerging more quickly than anticipated, and Europe's weak governments are in trouble." | + | :"Now the [[ammunition]] cupboard is bare, even in the United States. The Russians are learning how to counter advanced western systems, a negative development for NATO's security. It could not be a worse time to risk Europe's security on the basis of being able to stop a Russian attack. It may be easy for [[British]] [[politician]]s to scream they want NATO to fight in Ukraine, but it isn't [[London]] that is likely the first target of Russia's missiles. Cracks in the alliance are emerging more quickly than anticipated, and Europe's weak governments are in trouble." |
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| | ==References== | | ==References== |