| | Because "Kentucky is a strict adherent to the separation of powers doctrine," Kentucky law mandates that "the legislature must lay down policies and establish standards" for any limited delegation to be constitutional. Id. See, for example, Miller v. Covington Development Authority, 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976) (holding statute delegating broad powers to preserve historic or economic areas to be unconstitutional for not including detailed legislative criteria of what that entailed); and, Fawbush v. Bond 613 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Ky. 1981) (finding KRS 67.045 unconstitutional because it delegated responsibilities to district courts to evaluate and establish new boundaries from proposed redistricting plans on grounds that the statute failed to provide the criteria for such a review); and, Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Ky. 1984) (declaring a statute unconstitutional for delegating authority to the Legislative Research Commission because the delegation lacked standards to control the exercise of administrative discretion).}} | | Because "Kentucky is a strict adherent to the separation of powers doctrine," Kentucky law mandates that "the legislature must lay down policies and establish standards" for any limited delegation to be constitutional. Id. See, for example, Miller v. Covington Development Authority, 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976) (holding statute delegating broad powers to preserve historic or economic areas to be unconstitutional for not including detailed legislative criteria of what that entailed); and, Fawbush v. Bond 613 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Ky. 1981) (finding KRS 67.045 unconstitutional because it delegated responsibilities to district courts to evaluate and establish new boundaries from proposed redistricting plans on grounds that the statute failed to provide the criteria for such a review); and, Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Ky. 1984) (declaring a statute unconstitutional for delegating authority to the Legislative Research Commission because the delegation lacked standards to control the exercise of administrative discretion).}} |
| | + | {{cquote|The nondelegation doctrine recognizes that the Constitution vests the powers of government in three separate branches and, under the doctrine of separation of powers, each branch must exercise its own power rather than delegating it to another branch. Board of Trustees of Judicial Form Retirement System v. Attorney General of Commonwealth, 132 S.W.3d 770, 781 (Ky. 2003). ... |
| | + | The General Assembly may validly vest legislative or judicial authority in an administrative agency if the law delegating that authority provides "safeguards, procedural and otherwise, which prevent an abuse of discretion by the agency." Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky. 1981) (citing Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Ky. 1961)). Factors to consider in determining whether the law in question provides sufficient safeguards include the experience of the agency to which the authority is delegated, the subject matter of the law, and the availability of judicial review. Butler, 352 S.W.2d at 208. With regard to delegations of legislative authority, we also consider whether the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the agency from exercising unfettered discretion. Holsclaw [v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 471 (Ky. 1973)].}} |