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News of the ultimatum was received by the Russian government the following morning; at once, Sazonov, who told a subordinate that he now "considered war unavoidable," met with the heads of the Russian armed forces to discuss a "partial" mobilization of the army against Austria-Hungary (though not against Germany), while other officials began withdrawing Russian assets from German banks as a precaution. A partial mobilization was approved by the Council of Ministers that afternoon (pending the Tsar's assent); immediately after which, Sazonov instructed Serbia's ambassador that his country should reject the ultimatum, and that it could count on Russian aid in case of a war: a message then repeated in a meeting with the German ambassador, Count Friedrich Pourtalès. These decisions in Russia on July 24 are regarded as the beginning of the most critical period of the "July Crisis."
News of the ultimatum was received by the Russian government the following morning; at once, Sazonov, who told a subordinate that he now "considered war unavoidable," met with the heads of the Russian armed forces to discuss a "partial" mobilization of the army against Austria-Hungary (though not against Germany), while other officials began withdrawing Russian assets from German banks as a precaution. A partial mobilization was approved by the Council of Ministers that afternoon (pending the Tsar's assent); immediately after which, Sazonov instructed Serbia's ambassador that his country should reject the ultimatum, and that it could count on Russian aid in case of a war: a message then repeated in a meeting with the German ambassador, Count Friedrich Pourtalès. These decisions in Russia on July 24 are regarded as the beginning of the most critical period of the "July Crisis."
Encouraged by Russian promises, the Serbian government announced on July 25 that it would comply only partially with the Austrian ultimatum; some of the measures demanded would be implemented, but the participation of Austrian officials in the criminal investigation was firmly rejected. On receiving Serbia's answer that evening, ambassador Gieslingen immediately left Belgrade, signaling the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Already that afternoon, Serbia had begun secret mobilization of its armed forces, though this was not yet publicly declared. Surprisingly (due in part to the attempt at secrecy), Austria-Hungary did not immediately mobilize in response, and would not do so until July 28.
==Mediation Attempts==
Prior to the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, the Sarajevo assassination had faded into the background for most Europeans, including even many governments. Over the 24th and 25th, however, news first of the ultimatum and then of the beginning of Russian mobilization, which arrived in European capitals by Saturday evening, began awakening leaders to the possibility of at least a regional war. At once, proposals for mediating a peaceful end to the crisis, or at least for limiting its extent, were formulated. In Britain, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey suggested a four-power (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) mediation between Austria and Russia; the German government, by contrast, favored establishing a general agreement among all the powers to stay out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia--an arrangement that would obviously work to the advantage of Germany's ally, and thus Germany itself. For similarly self-interested reasons, France too rejected the idea of international mediation, as this would wreck the plans it and its Russian ally had worked out.
==References==
==References==