Changes

{{See also|Color revolution}}

{{See also|Color revolution}}

[[File:Lukashenko AK.PNG|right|300px|thumb|Lukashneko defending Belarusian [[sovereignty]] from US and CIA [[subversion]].]]

[[File:Lukashenko AK.PNG|right|300px|thumb|Lukashneko defending Belarusian [[sovereignty]] from US and CIA [[subversion]].]]

In August 2020, following Lukashenko’s Presidential electoral victory over opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a [[Euromaidan]]-style [[color revolution]] was launched against Minsk.  The former Soviet Republic has been a long-time target of the [[D.C.]]-based [[regime change]] lobby owing to Belarus being Moscow’s sole European ally, having highly-nationalized state industries, and the instalment of a pro-Western government would result in Russia’s entire Western border being composed solely of NATO-members and allies.<ref>https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/belarus-nationalised-industries-or-eu-privatisation</ref>

In August 2020, following Lukashenko's Presidential electoral victory over opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a [[Euromaidan]]-style [[color revolution]] was launched against Minsk.  The former Soviet Republic has been a long-time target of the [[D.C.]]-based [[regime change]] lobby owing to Belarus being Moscow's sole European ally, having highly nationalized state industries, and the instalment of a pro-Western government would result in Russia's entire Western border being composed solely of NATO-members and allies.<ref>https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/belarus-nationalised-industries-or-eu-privatisation</ref>

Carl Gershman, former head to the CIA's [[regime change]] arm the [[National Endowment for Democracy]] (NED), openly admitted to the NED's role behind unrest and subversion in Belarus.<ref>https://youtu.be/SKYSzaZQyro?t=995</ref>  Nazi apologist and [[Biden regime]] disinformation czar [[Nina Jankowicz]] managed “democracy assistance programs” to Belarus at the [[National Democratic Institute]] for International Affairs, a core [[CIA]] [[regime change]] NED [[front organization]].<ref>https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/nina-jankowicz</ref>

Carl Gershman, former head to the CIA's [[regime change]] arm the [[National Endowment for Democracy]] (NED), openly admitted to the NED's role behind unrest and subversion in Belarus.<ref>https://youtu.be/SKYSzaZQyro?t=995</ref>  Nazi apologist and [[Biden regime]] disinformation czar [[Nina Jankowicz]] managed “democracy assistance programs” to Belarus at the [[National Democratic Institute]] for International Affairs, a core [[CIA]] [[regime change]] NED [[front organization]].<ref>https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/nina-jankowicz</ref>

Following the recognition of Belarus as an independent state in December 1991 by the European Community, EU-Belarus relations initially experienced a steady progression. The signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1995 signaled a commitment to political, economic, and trade cooperation. Significant assistance was provided to Belarus within the framework of the TACIS technical assistance program and also through various aid programs and loans. However, progress in EU-Belarus relations stalled in 1996 after serious setbacks in the development of democracy. The EU did not recognize the 1996 constitution that replaced the 1994 constitution. Neither the PCA nor its trade-related elements were implemented, and Belarus was not invited to join the EU's Neighborhood Policy. Belarusian membership in the Council of Europe was not supported, bilateral relations at the ministerial level were suspended, and EU technical assistance programs were frozen. In 1998, relations were further worsened when President Lukashenka evicted several western ambassadors from their homes in the Drozdy area of Minsk. In 2004, the Council of Europe adopted a report written by special rapporteur Christos Pourgourides calling on Belarusian authorities to suspend various high-level officials after conducting a thorough investigation of the cases of several prominent Belarusian political figures who have disappeared and remain unaccounted for. In line with the U.S., the EU spoke strongly against the government's conduct of the 2006 election, noting that additional restrictive measures would be imposed against those officials responsible for abuses. After the election, the U.S. and EU imposed travel restrictions and financial sanctions against those responsible for abuses. The EU also launched a two-year, two million Euro project to support Belarusian access to independent information, which complements U.S. assistance programs. In June 2007, the EU announced the withdrawal of GSP trade preferences for Belarus, following an assessment by the International Labor Organization that Belarus had not acted to ensure the protection of labor rights and freedom of association. After the September 2008 parliamentary elections, the EU issued a statement expressing its concern about the conduct of the elections, which despite some progress did not correspond to the OSCE's democratic standards. In October 2008, the EU suspended its visa sanctions for six months on numerous Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenka, in response to Belarus’ release of political prisoners in August; this suspension has been extended until December 2009. In May 2009, the EU invited Belarus to take part in the Eastern Partnership Initiative.

Following the recognition of Belarus as an independent state in December 1991 by the European Community, EU-Belarus relations initially experienced a steady progression. The signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1995 signaled a commitment to political, economic, and trade cooperation. Significant assistance was provided to Belarus within the framework of the TACIS technical assistance program and also through various aid programs and loans. However, progress in EU-Belarus relations stalled in 1996 after serious setbacks in the development of democracy. The EU did not recognize the 1996 constitution that replaced the 1994 constitution. Neither the PCA nor its trade-related elements were implemented, and Belarus was not invited to join the EU's Neighborhood Policy. Belarusian membership in the Council of Europe was not supported, bilateral relations at the ministerial level were suspended, and EU technical assistance programs were frozen. In 1998, relations were further worsened when President Lukashenka evicted several western ambassadors from their homes in the Drozdy area of Minsk. In 2004, the Council of Europe adopted a report written by special rapporteur Christos Pourgourides calling on Belarusian authorities to suspend various high-level officials after conducting a thorough investigation of the cases of several prominent Belarusian political figures who have disappeared and remain unaccounted for. In line with the U.S., the EU spoke strongly against the government's conduct of the 2006 election, noting that additional restrictive measures would be imposed against those officials responsible for abuses. After the election, the U.S. and EU imposed travel restrictions and financial sanctions against those responsible for abuses. The EU also launched a two-year, two million Euro project to support Belarusian access to independent information, which complements U.S. assistance programs. In June 2007, the EU announced the withdrawal of GSP trade preferences for Belarus, following an assessment by the International Labor Organization that Belarus had not acted to ensure the protection of labor rights and freedom of association. After the September 2008 parliamentary elections, the EU issued a statement expressing its concern about the conduct of the elections, which despite some progress did not correspond to the OSCE's democratic standards. In October 2008, the EU suspended its visa sanctions for six months on numerous Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenka, in response to Belarus’ release of political prisoners in August; this suspension has been extended until December 2009. In May 2009, the EU invited Belarus to take part in the Eastern Partnership Initiative.

Acknowledging the lack of progress in relation to bilateral relations and the internal situation following the position adopted in 1997, the EU adopted a benchmark approach in 1999, whereby relations would be gradually improved upon fulfillment of the four benchmarks set by the OSCE. In 2000, some moderately positive developments toward the implementation of recommendations made by the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) were observed, but were not sufficient in the realm of access to fair and free elections. The Belarusian authorities, objecting to the OSCE AMG's activities, forced it to shutdown by failing to renew visas or extend accreditation of its professional staff. The Belarusian authorities agreed to a successor OSCE presence after 14 EU member countries and the U.S. imposed visa restrictions on the travel of high-ranking Belarusian officials. The OSCE Office in Minsk formally came into existence on January 1, 2003 with a mandate to "assist the Belarusian authorities in further promoting institution-building, in further consolidating the Rule of Law and in developing relations with civil society, in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments."

Acknowledging the lack of progress in relation to bilateral relations and the internal situation following the position adopted in 1997, the EU adopted a benchmark approach in 1999, whereby relations would be gradually improved upon fulfillment of the four benchmarks set by the OSCE. In 2000, some moderately positive developments toward the implementation of recommendations made by the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) were observed, but were not sufficient in the realm of access to fair and free elections. The Belarusian authorities, objecting to the OSCE AMG's activities, forced it to shutdown by failing to renew visas or extend accreditation of its professional staff. The Belarusian authorities agreed to a successor OSCE presence after 14 EU member countries and the U.S. imposed visa restrictions on the travel of high-ranking Belarusian officials. The OSCE Office in Minsk formally came into existence on January 1, 2003, with a mandate to "assist the Belarusian authorities in further promoting institution-building, in further consolidating the Rule of Law and in developing relations with civil society, in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments."

Russia is the largest partner for Belarus in the economic and political fields. In terms of trade, over one-third of Belarusian exports go to Russia. Due to the structure of Belarusian industry, Belarus relies heavily on other CIS countries, and Russia in particular, both for export markets and for the supply of raw materials, subsidized energy, and components. The steep increase in the price of natural gas in 2007, as well as higher tariffs on Russian-sourced oil and oil products, has contributed to a crisis in the Belarusian economy, forcing the regime to cut popular subsidies and to borrow from outside sources to finance the budget. Belarus received a $1.5 billion stabilization loan in late 2007 and a $2 billion loan in late 2008 from Russia.

Russia is the largest partner for Belarus in the economic and political fields. In terms of trade, over one-third of Belarusian exports go to Russia. Due to the structure of Belarusian industry, Belarus relies heavily on other CIS countries, and Russia in particular, both for export markets and for the supply of raw materials, subsidized energy, and components. The steep increase in the price of natural gas in 2007, as well as higher tariffs on Russian-sourced oil and oil products, has contributed to a crisis in the Belarusian economy, forcing the regime to cut popular subsidies and to borrow from outside sources to finance the budget. Belarus received a $1.5 billion stabilization loan in late 2007 and a $2 billion loan in late 2008 from Russia.

On February 27, 2022, voters in Belarus approved a constitutional amendment that essentially renounced the country's neutral and nonnuclear status. The new amendment does not approve the immediate deployment of nuclear weapons, but it does allow the country to host Russian weapons at bases in Belarus. [[President Lukashenko]] has indicated that Belarus would be willing to do so if the country were “threatened by [[the West]].” Specifically, he noted that he could ask Russia to return nuclear weapons to Belarus  

On February 27, 2022, voters in Belarus approved a constitutional amendment that essentially renounced the country's neutral and nonnuclear status. The new amendment does not approve the immediate deployment of nuclear weapons, but it does allow the country to host Russian weapons at bases in Belarus. [[President Lukashenko]] has indicated that Belarus would be willing to do so if the country were “threatened by [[the West]].” Specifically, he noted that he could ask Russia to return nuclear weapons to Belarus  

if NATO transferred nuclear weapons to Poland or Lithuania, nations that share borders with Belarus.<ref>Matthias Williams and David Ljunggren, “Belarus referendum approves proposal to renounce non-nuclear status,” ''[[Reuters]]'', February 27, 2022.</ref>

if NATO transferred nuclear weapons to Poland or Lithuania, nations that share borders with Belarus.<ref name="David Ljunggren 2022">Matthias Williams and David Ljunggren, “Belarus referendum approves proposal to renounce non-nuclear status,” ''[[Reuters]]'', February 27, 2022.</ref>

On March 1, 2022, the [[Zelensky regime]] threatened Belarus with a pre-emptive strike.<ref>https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Ukraine-Threatens-Belarus-to-Launch-Preemptive-Attack-20220301-0010.html</ref>

On March 1, 2022, the [[Zelensky regime]] threatened Belarus with a pre-emptive strike.<ref>https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Ukraine-Threatens-Belarus-to-Launch-Preemptive-Attack-20220301-0010.html</ref>

On March 15, 2022 Belarus was hit with an organized sabotage campaign aimed at railroad lines carrying Russian troops and humanitarian supplies into Ukraine.<ref>https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-699184</ref>

On March 15, 2022, Belarus was hit with an organized sabotage campaign aimed at railroad lines carrying Russian troops and humanitarian supplies into Ukraine.<ref>https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-699184</ref>

On May 10, 2022, Belarus announced that Ukraine created “an armed group of up to 20,000 personnel” on the border with the country. The military of Belarus announced that “in order to ensure security … in the southern direction, the forces of the special operations forces units are deployed in three tactical directions,” he said.

On May 10, 2022, Belarus announced that Ukraine created “an armed group of up to 20,000 personnel” on the border with the country. The military of Belarus announced that “in order to ensure security … in the southern direction, the forces of the special operations forces units are deployed in three tactical directions,” he said.

Video of the shipment of new tanks and equipment to the Polish border appeared on line on June 2, 2022.<ref>https://www.bitchute.com/video/qcsvXiQVu88k/</ref>

Video of the shipment of new tanks and equipment to the Polish border appeared on line on June 2, 2022.<ref>https://www.bitchute.com/video/qcsvXiQVu88k/</ref>

On September 20, 2022, Belarus took steps to begin a general mobilization.<ref>https://youtu.be/NFwID2qF3HY</ref>

On September 20, 2022, Belarus took steps to begin a general mobilization.<ref name="youtu.be">https://youtu.be/NFwID2qF3HY</ref>

On October 10, 2022, it was reported that the Kyiv regime blew up all the bridges on roads leading from Belarus.

On October 10, 2022, it was reported that the Kyiv regime blew up all the bridges on roads leading from Belarus.

On October 14, 2022, Belarus went on high alert against a NATO terror attack.<ref>https://youtu.be/NFwID2qF3HY</ref>

On October 14, 2022, Belarus went on high alert against a NATO terror attack.<ref name="youtu.be"/>

On October 17, 2022, the Belarus defense ministry issued a statement saying it reserved the right for preemptive strategic deterrence measures.<ref>https://tass.com/world/1523983</ref>

On October 17, 2022, the Belarus defense ministry issued a statement saying it reserved the right for preemptive strategic deterrence measures.<ref>https://tass.com/world/1523983</ref>

On December 3, 2022, Belarus and Russia established a uniform command structure.  Belarus fears a NATO invasion.

On December 3, 2022, Belarus and Russia established a uniform command structure.  Belarus fears a NATO invasion.

On April 3, 2023 President Lukashenko informed the people of Belarus in nationally televised address that NATO, led by Poland, was preparing to invade the country, and to carrying on a terrorist [[hybrid war]] and insurgency on the territory of Belarus.

On April 3, 2023, President Lukashenko informed the people of Belarus in nationally televised address that NATO, led by Poland, was preparing to invade the country, and to carrying on a terrorist [[hybrid war]] and insurgency on the territory of Belarus.

====Polish revanchism and NATO aggression====

====Polish revanchism and NATO aggression====

President Lukashenko stated that Belarus would be forced to react militarily to any Polish annexation of western Ukraine. The stated reason is that Belarus is already surrounded by NATO members in the [[Baltic states]] and [[Poland]] on east and west, and he cannot allow the Belarus to be strategically compromised from the south as well. Poland had been promised to be rewarded with annexation of western Ukraine for its support in the NATO war in Ukraine. Belarus would be forced to react militarily to any Polish annexation of western Ukraine. Belarus cannot allow itself to be strategically compromised from the south as well.

President Lukashenko stated that Belarus would be forced to react militarily to any Polish annexation of western Ukraine. The stated reason is that Belarus is already surrounded by NATO members in the [[Baltic states]] and [[Poland]] on east and west, and he cannot allow the Belarus to be strategically compromised from the south as well. Poland had been promised to be rewarded with annexation of western Ukraine for its support in the NATO war in Ukraine. Belarus would be forced to react militarily to any Polish annexation of western Ukraine. Belarus cannot allow itself to be strategically compromised from the south as well.

If Poland were to annex western Ukraine on Belarus’s southern border, that puts all of western Belarus, most critically the cities of [[Brest]] and [[Grodno]], in a potential pincer should NATO choose to attack in the future. NATO can easily cut off Brest and Grodno entirely in one fell stroke.

If Poland were to annex western Ukraine on Belarus's southern border, that puts all of western Belarus, most critically the cities of [[Brest]] and [[Grodno]], in a potential pincer should NATO choose to attack in the future. NATO can easily cut off Brest and Grodno entirely in one fell stroke.

==Defense==

==Defense==

Belarus is considered a "nuclear-weapon state" (NWS) since it has [[nuclear weapon]] capabilities making it one of the  [[Nuclear target structures#Primary Targets|primary targets]] among the world's major [[nuclear target structures]] in a possible [[nuclear war]].<ref>[http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/belarus/nuclear/ ''Nuclear Country Profile''], [[Washington, DC]]: Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Last updated: May, 2014. Accessed January 15, 2015</ref>

Belarus is considered a "nuclear-weapon state" (NWS) since it has [[nuclear weapon]] capabilities making it one of the  [[Nuclear target structures#Primary Targets|primary targets]] among the world's major [[nuclear target structures]] in a possible [[nuclear war]].<ref>[http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/belarus/nuclear/ ''Nuclear Country Profile''], [[Washington, DC]]: Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Last updated: May, 2014. Accessed January 15, 2015</ref>

On February 27, 2022 voters in Belarus approved a constitutional amendment that essentially renounced the country’s neutral and nonnuclear status. The new amendment does not approve the immediate deployment of nuclear weapons, but it does allow the country to host Russian weapons at bases in Belarus. [[President Lukashenko]] has indicated that Belarus would be willing to do so if the country were “threatened by [[the West]].” Specifically, he noted that he could ask Russia to return nuclear weapons to Belarus  

On February 27, 2022, voters in Belarus approved a constitutional amendment that essentially renounced the country's neutral and nonnuclear status. The new amendment does not approve the immediate deployment of nuclear weapons, but it does allow the country to host Russian weapons at bases in Belarus. [[President Lukashenko]] has indicated that Belarus would be willing to do so if the country were “threatened by [[the West]].” Specifically, he noted that he could ask Russia to return nuclear weapons to Belarus  

if [[NATO]] transferred nuclear weapons to [[Poland]] or [[Lithuania]], nations that share borders with Belarus.<ref> Matthias Williams and David Ljunggren, “Belarus referendum approves proposal to renounce non-nuclear status,” ''[[Reuters]]'', February 27, 2022.</ref>

if [[NATO]] transferred nuclear weapons to [[Poland]] or [[Lithuania]], nations that share borders with Belarus.<ref name="David Ljunggren 2022"/>

==Economy==

==Economy==