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| | <blockquote>That said, the Constitution affords the Executive Branch authority to unilaterally provide relief to the defendant, if the Executive wishes to do so. The Framers of the Constitution contemplated that a federal criminal conviction or sentence might later be questioned by the Executive. And Article II of the Constitution grants the President broad unilateral authority to pardon federal defendants and to commute federal sentences. Art. II, §2, cl. 1. Presidents regularly exercise that power. | | <blockquote>That said, the Constitution affords the Executive Branch authority to unilaterally provide relief to the defendant, if the Executive wishes to do so. The Framers of the Constitution contemplated that a federal criminal conviction or sentence might later be questioned by the Executive. And Article II of the Constitution grants the President broad unilateral authority to pardon federal defendants and to commute federal sentences. Art. II, §2, cl. 1. Presidents regularly exercise that power. |
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| − | In order to provide relief to the defendant in this case, [***3] the Executive Branch therefore has no need to enlist the Judiciary, [**1129] or to ask the Judiciary to depart from standard practices and procedures. To the extent that the Department of Justice has concluded that this defendant’s conviction should be vacated or that his sentence should be reduced, the Attorney General may recommend a pardon or commutation to the President, and the President may pardon the defendant or commute the sentence.</blockquote> | + | In order to provide relief to the defendant in this case, the Executive Branch therefore has no need to enlist the Judiciary, or to ask the Judiciary to depart from standard practices and procedures. To the extent that the Department of Justice has concluded that this defendant’s conviction should be vacated or that his sentence should be reduced, the Attorney General may recommend a pardon or commutation to the President, and the President may pardon the defendant or commute the sentence.</blockquote> |
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| | Justice Sotomayor in the same case in dissent from denial of a request for a GVR, on behalf of a total of 4 Justices: | | Justice Sotomayor in the same case in dissent from denial of a request for a GVR, on behalf of a total of 4 Justices: |
| − | <blockquote>Plainly, the Article II pardon power, which applies in all federal criminal cases, does not obviate or impliedly displace available judicial processes and remedies. To the contrary, while Presidential pardons and commutations may be granted as acts of mercy, to address changes in society or personal circumstances, or for other reasons, they have never been understood as mechanisms for correcting errors, whether by courts or by the Government. Moreover, relying on the theoretical availability of a pardon overlooks the fact that the courts, not just the Government, initially erred by approving Grzegorczyk’s unlawful sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.<blockquote> | + | <blockquote>Plainly, the Article II pardon power, which applies in all federal criminal cases, does not obviate or impliedly displace available judicial processes and remedies. To the contrary, while Presidential pardons and commutations may be granted as acts of mercy, to address changes in society or personal circumstances, or for other reasons, they have never been understood as mechanisms for correcting errors, whether by courts or by the Government. Moreover, relying on the theoretical availability of a pardon overlooks the fact that the courts, not just the Government, initially erred by approving Grzegorczyk’s unlawful sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.</blockquote> |
| | ''Grzegorczyk v. United States'', 142 S. Ct. 2580, 2586 n.7 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). | | ''Grzegorczyk v. United States'', 142 S. Ct. 2580, 2586 n.7 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). |
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