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| | American conservatives greatly admired and supported Chiang and his wife. Long derided by liberals, his reputation has been improving among scholars. For eighty years the Chinese history has unfolded in the rivalry of Chiang and Mao. In recent years Mao's reputation has collapsed, as China has discarded socialism, embraced capitalism, and taken off to economic prosperity—following the model of the much smaller Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Chinese are embracing the vision that Chiang espoused: the vision of a China achieving modernity in its economy, parity in military prowess, and building political stability on a basis of traditional nationalism. Taylor (2009) argues that, far from being incompetent, Chiang was a farsighted, disciplined and canny strategist who repeatedly predicted major geopolitical events and worked effectively for China, given its poverty. Chiang laid the foundation not only for Taiwan's prosperity, but also for its transformation into the only democracy in the Chinese-speaking world, and one of the few in Asia. Even the mainland, where he was the great enemy for a half century, Chiang is now widely regarded as a national patriot who made valuable contributions to the modernization of China. The Communist leaders in Beijing have looked to Taiwan as a model for what a prosperous and free Chinese society might be like. Some mainstream Chinese scholars are suggesting that the country might have been better off had Chiang triumphed in 1949 instead of Mao.<ref>Jonathan D. Spence, "The Enigma of Chiang Kai-shek," [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=23175 ''New York review of Books,'' Volume 56, Number 16 (Oct. 22, 2009) excerpt online]</ref> | | American conservatives greatly admired and supported Chiang and his wife. Long derided by liberals, his reputation has been improving among scholars. For eighty years the Chinese history has unfolded in the rivalry of Chiang and Mao. In recent years Mao's reputation has collapsed, as China has discarded socialism, embraced capitalism, and taken off to economic prosperity—following the model of the much smaller Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Chinese are embracing the vision that Chiang espoused: the vision of a China achieving modernity in its economy, parity in military prowess, and building political stability on a basis of traditional nationalism. Taylor (2009) argues that, far from being incompetent, Chiang was a farsighted, disciplined and canny strategist who repeatedly predicted major geopolitical events and worked effectively for China, given its poverty. Chiang laid the foundation not only for Taiwan's prosperity, but also for its transformation into the only democracy in the Chinese-speaking world, and one of the few in Asia. Even the mainland, where he was the great enemy for a half century, Chiang is now widely regarded as a national patriot who made valuable contributions to the modernization of China. The Communist leaders in Beijing have looked to Taiwan as a model for what a prosperous and free Chinese society might be like. Some mainstream Chinese scholars are suggesting that the country might have been better off had Chiang triumphed in 1949 instead of Mao.<ref>Jonathan D. Spence, "The Enigma of Chiang Kai-shek," [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=23175 ''New York review of Books,'' Volume 56, Number 16 (Oct. 22, 2009) excerpt online]</ref> |
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| − | Despite being the foremost leader against Fascist Japan's brutal invasion of China during [[World War II]], Chiang is slandered by liberal and Communists as a "fascist." | + | Despite being the foremost leader against Fascist Japan's brutal invasion of China during [[World War II]], Chiang is slandered by liberals and Communists as a "fascist." |
| | | | |
| | === Early life === | | === Early life === |
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| | Full-scale war — the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] began at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking in July 1937. | | Full-scale war — the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] began at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking in July 1937. |
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| − | ==1937-1948== | + | ==1937–48== |
| | Chiang was in full charge of the KMT after 1927, with the title of "generalissimo"; he thus ruled that part of China controlled by the KMT. With the Japanese gaining more Chinese territory, the policy of "trading space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間) was adopted. Chiang moved, not only his government, but much of China's industrial production, several hundred miles west to the interior city of Chunking, in the remote mountains of [[Sichuan]] province. | | Chiang was in full charge of the KMT after 1927, with the title of "generalissimo"; he thus ruled that part of China controlled by the KMT. With the Japanese gaining more Chinese territory, the policy of "trading space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間) was adopted. Chiang moved, not only his government, but much of China's industrial production, several hundred miles west to the interior city of Chunking, in the remote mountains of [[Sichuan]] province. |
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| | In September 1943, Chiang Kai-shek formally became president of the central executive committee of the KMT, and was recognized as the head of state and head of government of free China. In November 1943 Chiang attended the [[Cairo Conference]], where he, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] drafted the Cairo declaration proclaiming Allied war objectives for the Far East. China was assured a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council when it formed in 1945.<ref>Chiang and his son controlled the seat until 1970, when the UN voted to give it to the Communist regime.</ref> | | In September 1943, Chiang Kai-shek formally became president of the central executive committee of the KMT, and was recognized as the head of state and head of government of free China. In November 1943 Chiang attended the [[Cairo Conference]], where he, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] drafted the Cairo declaration proclaiming Allied war objectives for the Far East. China was assured a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council when it formed in 1945.<ref>Chiang and his son controlled the seat until 1970, when the UN voted to give it to the Communist regime.</ref> |
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| | === Conclusion of the Chinese Civil War === | | === Conclusion of the Chinese Civil War === |
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| | General [[George C. Marshall]] was sent in late 1945 by President Truman to resolve the Chinese civil war, hopefully by creating a new shared power arrangement between the Communists and Chiang's Nationalists. His specific instructions from Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] were to insist on a coalition government as a condition for continued aid to the Nationalists.<ref>Forrest C. Pogue, ''George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959'', (1987), p. 61.</ref> Communist leader Mao Zedong had already said publicly in April 1945 that a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalists would result in the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." <ref>"On Coalition Government," address to the April 1945 Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', (1963), p. 238.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', (1964), p. 429.</ref> | | General [[George C. Marshall]] was sent in late 1945 by President Truman to resolve the Chinese civil war, hopefully by creating a new shared power arrangement between the Communists and Chiang's Nationalists. His specific instructions from Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] were to insist on a coalition government as a condition for continued aid to the Nationalists.<ref>Forrest C. Pogue, ''George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959'', (1987), p. 61.</ref> Communist leader Mao Zedong had already said publicly in April 1945 that a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalists would result in the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." <ref>"On Coalition Government," address to the April 1945 Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', (1963), p. 238.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', (1964), p. 429.</ref> |
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| | == Poetry == | | == Poetry == |
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| | Chiang was also known for his poetry. He wrote a poem expressing exultation after his victory over the Communist Party, in 1928: | | Chiang was also known for his poetry. He wrote a poem expressing exultation after his victory over the Communist Party, in 1928: |
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| | ==See also== | | ==See also== |
| | * [[Kuomintang]] | | * [[Kuomintang]] |
| | + | |
| | ==Bibliography== | | ==Bibliography== |
| | ===Biography=== | | ===Biography=== |
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| | * Ven, Hans van de. ''War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945'' (2003), negative on Stilwell [http://www.questia.com/read/107990148?title=War%20and%20Nationalism%20in%20China%201925-1945 online edition] | | * Ven, Hans van de. ''War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945'' (2003), negative on Stilwell [http://www.questia.com/read/107990148?title=War%20and%20Nationalism%20in%20China%201925-1945 online edition] |
| | * Westad, Odd Arne. ''Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. '' (2003). 413 pp. the standard history | | * Westad, Odd Arne. ''Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. '' (2003). 413 pp. the standard history |
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| | ===Relations with U.S.=== | | ===Relations with U.S.=== |
| | * Byrd Martha. ''Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger.'' (1987). | | * Byrd Martha. ''Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger.'' (1987). |
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| | * Taylor, Jeremy E. "The Production of the Chiang Kai-shek Personality Cult, 1929-1975." ''China Quarterly'' 2006 (185): 96-110. Issn: 0305-7410 | | * Taylor, Jeremy E. "The Production of the Chiang Kai-shek Personality Cult, 1929-1975." ''China Quarterly'' 2006 (185): 96-110. Issn: 0305-7410 |
| | * Ven, Hans Van De. "Stilwell in the Stocks: the Chinese Nationalists and the Allied Powers in the Second World War." ''Asian Affairs'' 2003 34(3): 243-259. Issn: 0306-8374 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]], revisionist argument that Stilwell was incompetent, had no command training or experience, and did not appreciate air power. Ven suggests that Roosevelt's needs in the presidential election of 1944, the strategic decision to defeat the Nazi menace in Europe before giving full attention to Japan, and the unwise yielding to the needs of the Soviet Union during World War II all led to the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists. | | * Ven, Hans Van De. "Stilwell in the Stocks: the Chinese Nationalists and the Allied Powers in the Second World War." ''Asian Affairs'' 2003 34(3): 243-259. Issn: 0306-8374 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]], revisionist argument that Stilwell was incompetent, had no command training or experience, and did not appreciate air power. Ven suggests that Roosevelt's needs in the presidential election of 1944, the strategic decision to defeat the Nazi menace in Europe before giving full attention to Japan, and the unwise yielding to the needs of the Soviet Union during World War II all led to the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists. |
| − | ===Primary Sources=== | + | |
| | + | ===Primary sources=== |
| | * Chiang Kai-shek. ''The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945,'' (1946) [http://www.questia.com/read/79830145?title=The%20Collected%20Wartime%20Messages%20of%20Generalissimo%20Chiang%20Kai-Shek%2c%201937-1945 online edition] | | * Chiang Kai-shek. ''The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945,'' (1946) [http://www.questia.com/read/79830145?title=The%20Collected%20Wartime%20Messages%20of%20Generalissimo%20Chiang%20Kai-Shek%2c%201937-1945 online edition] |
| | * Chiang Kai-shek. ''All We Are and All We Have: Speeches and Messages since Pearl Harbor'' (1948) [http://www.questia.com/read/9750466?title=All%20We%20Are%20and%20All%20We%20Have%3a%20Speeches%20and%20Messages%20since%20Pearl%20Harbor online edition] | | * Chiang Kai-shek. ''All We Are and All We Have: Speeches and Messages since Pearl Harbor'' (1948) [http://www.questia.com/read/9750466?title=All%20We%20Are%20and%20All%20We%20Have%3a%20Speeches%20and%20Messages%20since%20Pearl%20Harbor online edition] |
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| | * [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/sinojapaperbib2.pdf Steven Phillips, "English-Language Sources on China at War, 1937-1945: Bibliography"] | | * [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/sinojapaperbib2.pdf Steven Phillips, "English-Language Sources on China at War, 1937-1945: Bibliography"] |
| | * [http://hua.umf.maine.edu/China/republic.html "The Republican Era: 1911-1949"], comprehensive bibliography | | * [http://hua.umf.maine.edu/China/republic.html "The Republican Era: 1911-1949"], comprehensive bibliography |
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| | ====notes==== | | ====notes==== |
| − | <references/>
| + | {{reflist}} |
| − | | |
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| | {{DEFAULTSORT:Chiang, Kai-shek}} | | {{DEFAULTSORT:Chiang, Kai-shek}} |