| | In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz largely dismissed the value of military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false." His conclusions were influenced by his personal experiences in the Prussian Army, which was often in an intelligence fog due to the superior abilities of Napoleon's system. | | In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz largely dismissed the value of military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false." His conclusions were influenced by his personal experiences in the Prussian Army, which was often in an intelligence fog due to the superior abilities of Napoleon's system. |
| − | Clausewitz had a strong influence on German military thought,<ref>Antulio Joseph Echevarria, II, ''After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War'' (2001) [https://www.amazon.com/After-Clausewitz-German-Military-Thinkers/dp/0700610715/ref=sr_1_10?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213823024&sr=8-10 excerpt and text search]</ref> and after 1900 on British thought. He had little influence on American military thought before 1945.<ref>Christopher Bassford, ''Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945.'' (1994)</ref> But he influenced [[Lenin]] and the Soviet tradition, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war.<ref>Jacob W. Kipp, "Lenin and Clausewitz: the Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921." ''Military Affairs'' 1985 49(4): 184-191. Issn: 0026-3931 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931(198510)49%3A4%3C184%3ALACTMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 in Jstor]</ref> Clausewitz directly influenced Chinese leader [[Mao Zedung]]. Mao read Clausewitz's ''On War'' in 1938 and organized a seminar on Clausewitz as part of the educational program for the Party leadership in Yan'an. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely secondhand knowledge, via Lenin (as many have supposed), but reflects Mao's own in-depth study. | + | Clausewitz had a strong influence on German military thought,<ref>Antulio Joseph Echevarria, II, ''After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War'' (2001) [https://www.amazon.com/After-Clausewitz-German-Military-Thinkers/dp/0700610715/ref=sr_1_10?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213823024&sr=8-10 excerpt and text search]</ref> and after 1900 on British thought. He had little influence on American military thought before 1945.<ref>Christopher Bassford, ''Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945.'' (1994)</ref> But he influenced [[Lenin]] and the Soviet tradition, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war.<ref>Jacob W. Kipp, "Lenin and Clausewitz: the Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921." ''Military Affairs'' 1985 49(4): 184-191. Issn: 0026-3931 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931(198510)49%3A4%3C184%3ALACTMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 in Jstor]</ref> Clausewitz directly influenced Chinese leader Mao Zedong. Mao read Clausewitz's ''On War'' in 1938 and organized a seminar on Clausewitz as part of the educational program for the Party leadership in Yan'an. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely secondhand knowledge, via Lenin (as many have supposed), but reflects Mao's own in-depth study. |