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'''Non-delegation doctrine''' is a principle under the [[U.S. Constitution]] and state constitutions that limits or even prohibits delegation by one branch of government to another.
 
'''Non-delegation doctrine''' is a principle under the [[U.S. Constitution]] and state constitutions that limits or even prohibits delegation by one branch of government to another.
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== California ==
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The California non-delegation doctrine is based on the separation-of-powers provision of the California Constitution, art. III, § 3. “The separation of powers doctrine limits the authority of one of the three branches of government to arrogate to itself the core functions of another branch.” ''Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State'' (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 297. But this doctrine “recognizes that the three branches of government are interdependent, and it permits actions of one branch that may ‘significantly affect those of another branch.’” ''Id.'' at p. 298.
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The purpose is to ensure that “the legislative body must itself effectively resolve the truly fundamental [policy] issues.” ''Kugler v. Yocum'' (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 376. The Legislature “properly may delegate some quasi-legislative or rulemaking authority,” and “[f]or the most part, delegation of quasi-legislative authority ... is not considered an unconstitutional abdication of legislative power.” ''Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd.'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1146.
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California courts have broadly held that “delegation by legislative bodies is essential to the basic ability of government to function.” ''Golightly v. Molina'' (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1515. ''See also Salmon Trollers Mktg. Assn. v. Fullerton'' (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 291, 300. Delegations of quasi-legislative authority are common, and “courts are understandably reluctant to interfere with such delegations.” ''Id.''
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As held by the California court in the ''Gerawan Farming'' decision, an unconstitutional delegation occurs only when a legislative body (1) delegates the resolution of the fundamental policy issue to others, (2) fails to establish adequate direction for the implementation of that policy, '''or''' (3) fails to include safeguards adequate to prevent abuse. 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1146, 1150-1151. Courts apply these criteria flexibly to a statute. ''See Kugler v. Yocum'', 69 Cal.2d at p. 381 (“[t]he requirement for ‘standards’ is but one method for the effective implementation of the legislative policy decision; the requirement possesses no sacrosanct quality in itself so long as its purpose may otherwise be assured”); ''Sims v. Kernan'' (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 105, 114 (inferring from the statute's policy the required “standards”).
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== Kentucky ==
 
== Kentucky ==
 
The precedents in Kentucky on this issue include:
 
The precedents in Kentucky on this issue include:
Anthony, Irenaeus, Siteadmin, apieditor, Bureaucrats, Check users, nsAm_Govt_101RO, nsAm_Govt_101RW, nsAm_Govt_101_ta, nsJudgesRO, nsJudgesRW, nsJudges_talkRO, nsJudges_talkRW, nsTeam2RO, nsTeam2RW, nsTeam2_talkRO, nsTeam2_talkRW, oversight, Administrators
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