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| | {{See also|2023 Ukraine counteroffensive}} | | {{See also|2023 Ukraine counteroffensive}} |
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| − | In December 2023 the ''[[Washington Post]]'' released a two-article series, ''Miscalculations, Divisions Marked Offensive Planning By U.S., Ukraine'' and ''In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls''. It dispenses equal blame on the US and UIK planning of the whole mess and the [[Ukrainian]] execution of it:<ref>[https://www.moonofalabama.org/2023/12/the-war-in-ukraine-is-done.html The War In Ukraine Is Done], Moon of Alabama, December 05, 2023. moonofalabama.org</ref> | + | In December 2023 the ''[[Washington Post]]'' released a two-article series, ''Miscalculations, Divisions Marked Offensive Planning By U.S., Ukraine'' and ''In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls''. It dispenses equal blame on the US and UIK planning of the whole mess and the Ukrainian execution of it:<ref>[https://www.moonofalabama.org/2023/12/the-war-in-ukraine-is-done.html The War In Ukraine Is Done], Moon of Alabama, December 05, 2023. moonofalabama.org</ref> |
| | [[File:Bradley Square.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Destroyed German [[Leopard 2]] tanks and American Bradley Fight Vehicles on what the Russians called '''[[Bradley Square]]'''.]] | | [[File:Bradley Square.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Destroyed German [[Leopard 2]] tanks and American Bradley Fight Vehicles on what the Russians called '''[[Bradley Square]]'''.]] |
| − | {{quotebox-float|'''Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine''' | + | {{quotebox-float|'''Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by [[U.S.]], [[Ukraine]]''' |
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| − | Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a [[Western alliance|Western-style fighting force]] in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries. | + | Ukrainian, U.S. and [[British]] [[military]] officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a [[Western alliance|Western-style fighting force]] in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries. |
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| | U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over [[strategy]], [[tactics]] and timing. The [[Pentagon]] wanted the assault to begin in mid-April [2023] to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional [[weapon]]s and training. | | U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over [[strategy]], [[tactics]] and timing. The [[Pentagon]] wanted the assault to begin in mid-April [2023] to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional [[weapon]]s and training. |