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→Donald Trump
{{See also|Donald Trump achievements}}
{{See also|Donald Trump achievements}}
Despite heavy opposition from the political [[establishment]], businessman [[Donald Trump]] defeated sixteen other candidates in the Republican primaries and defeated the heavy favorite in the general election, Hillary Clinton. As president, Trump enacted strongly conservative policies in issues such as deregulation, trade, immigration, religious freedom, abortion, and judges.
Despite heavy opposition from the political [[establishment]], businessman [[Donald Trump]] defeated sixteen other candidates in the Republican primaries and defeated the heavy favorite in the general election, Hillary Clinton. As president, Trump enacted strongly conservative policies in issues such as deregulation, trade, immigration, religious freedom, abortion, and judges.
=== Fertility rates of conservatives vs. liberals in the United States. The conservative fertility advantage probably will not give conservatives some inevitable long-term political edge ===
''See also:'' [[Fertility rates of conservatives vs. liberals in the United States]]
[[File:Donald Trump official presidential photo.jpg|180px|right|thumb|[[Donald Trump]] ]]
The article ''The Conservative Fertility Advantage'' by the Institute for Family Institute indicates:
{{Cquote|Data about fertility rates is only available for around 600 of the largest counties, thus many small, rural counties are excluded. But the relationship shown here is clear: President [[Donald Trump|Trump]] did better in counties with higher birth rates, and the difference is fairly large, with the most pro-Biden counties having total fertility rates almost 25% lower than the most pro-Trump counties. If anything, this effect is understated, since the most pro-Trump counties were small, rural counties that usually have even higher birth rates and are excluded from this analysis. Indeed, Yi Fuxian at the University of Wisconsin showed that the relationship between voting and fertility is even more pronounced when we look at fertility rates and state voting trends...
As can be seen, the [[Republican]] fertility advantage is relatively stable across elections. It even shows up in a panel model, suggesting that as counties become more Republican, their fertility rates tend to rise relative to the national average. The use of state controls (and some robustness tests I ran in large states with many counties) suggests this effect isn’t driven by unique features of states: within [[Red state]]s or [[Blue states]], and controlling for county racial and ethnic characteristics and population densities, Republican counties have higher birth rates.
This is particularly astonishing given that Democrats perform very well in counties with many Hispanic and black voters, who have higher birth rates than non-Hispanic white Americans (and indeed, the more non-Hispanic whites in a county, the lower its birth rate in my models). The relationship is also unchanged if the sample is restricted to only very-high-density counties, such as those representing the center of major cities. In other words, the Republican “fertility advantage” does not arise from more rural counties with higher birth rates, and it exists despite the fact that much of the Democratic Party’s electoral base is among racial and ethnic groups with higher birth rates in general. The split I identify isn’t about race or urbanization or region of the country: it’s about family. Within racial- or ethnic-groups, within states or urbanized areas, the more conservative areas tend to have more babies.
In the 1970s, there was little or no difference in fertility rates between liberal and conservative women. But by the 2000s, completed fertility for liberal women had declined markedly below that of conservative women. In recent years, the gap in childbearing between young conservative and liberal women has really opened, which may portend a bigger gap in the coming years...
Before the 1990s, fertility differences by ideology were small. Women over age 45 had no difference in completed fertility, and women of all ages (but with controls for year of age) had only a small difference. There was, however, already a difference in ideology: conservative women reported a childbearing ideal about 0.12 kids higher than liberal women, which is a small, but significant, difference.
For the period after 1995, however, gaps grow. Conservative women over age 45 had about 0.25 more children on average than their liberal peers, an effect which in fact shows up throughout the age distribution once the “over 45” restriction is relaxed. The gap in fertility ideals grew larger as well.
In other words, the “family gap” between conservatives and liberals is a new phenomenon. It’s only in the last two decades that conservatives began to reap a fertility advantage. But it’s not just a fertility difference: if controls for marital status are removed, the conservative fertility advantage gets even bigger. That is, conservatives are simply more likely to be married than liberals. Thus, there is a conservative-liberal gap on marriage and separately on odds of childbearing conditional upon marital status...
Finally, this conservative fertility advantage probably will not give conservatives some inevitable long-term political edge. Fertility rates are falling for conservatives just as much as liberals. Given the size of the fertility differential between conservatives and liberals, it doesn’t actually take a large amount of ideology switching to offset this higher birth rate. Thus, while conservatives may wish that their fertility advantage could afford a durable political majority, that hope is probably just as fleeting as the now-silly-sounding claims of progressives a decade ago that immigration would create a durable Democratic majority. That’s because, at least right now, conservative parents have not been sufficiently successful in keeping their kids in the fold.<ref>[https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-conservative-fertility-advantage The Conservative Fertility Advantage] by the Institute for Family Institute</ref>}}
==Conservatism outside the United States==
==Conservatism outside the United States==