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2023 Ukraine summer counteroffensive (view source)
Revision as of 22:20, February 24, 2024
, 22:20, February 24, 2024no edit summary
{{Main article|NATO war in Ukraine}}
{{Main article|NATO war in Ukraine}}
[[File:Bradley Square.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Destroyed German Leopard 2 tanks and American Bradley Fight Vehicles on what the Russians called '''Bradley Square'''.]]
[[File:Bradley Square.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Destroyed German Leopard 2 tanks and American Bradley Fight Vehicles on what the Russians called '''Bradley Square'''.]]
The '''2023 Ukraine summer counteroffensive''' began on June 4, 2023. By July 2023, Ukrainian casualties were mounting, and it became increasingly clear that the counteroffensive would fail to capture significant amounts of territory. Western reporting grew more realistic, and began giving insights into conditions on the ground in [[Ukraine]], as well as what was in the minds of [[US]] officials.
The '''2023 Ukraine summer counteroffensive''' began on June 4, 2023. Lt. Col. Dr. Konstantin Sivkov, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences for Information Policy, Doctor of Military Sciences made this assessment:
{{quotebox-float|"The goals of the Ukrainian army’s offensive in the summer of 2023 and the size of combat groups formed to carry it out are to a certain extent comparable with what the [[Wehrmacht|German military]] fielded for its Operation Citadel in 1943.
According to the ''Washington Post'',<ref>https://archive.ph/GmW5m#selection-1169.4-1169.55</ref> US and Ukrainian militaries had conducted war games and had anticipated that an advance would be accompanied by heavy losses. But when the real-world fatalities mounted, the ''Post'' reported, “Ukraine chose to stem the losses on the battlefield”.
This gives us the grounds for calling Kiev’s offensive in the summer of 2023 [[Operation Citadel 2.0]].
Considering its military-political consequences, the collapse of Citadel 2.0 meant not simply the Ukrainian army’s military-strategic defeat but also the collapse of the [[Collective West|consolidated West's]] [[hybrid war|hybrid]] [[blitzkrieg]].
We can state boldly that the so-called counteroffensive attempted by the Ukrainian military in the summer of 2023 was an event against whose background all the other developments could hardly attract so much attention.
This is not surprising because this counteroffensive was of key significance in the standoff between [[the West]] and Russia as its outcome largely shaped not only the situation in the [[special military operation]] area, Russia and Ukraine, but also trends of the changing global situation."<ref>https://tass.com/defense/1750919</ref>}}
By July 2023, Ukrainian casualties were mounting, and it became increasingly clear that the counteroffensive would fail to capture significant amounts of territory. Western reporting grew more realistic, and began giving insights into conditions on the ground in [[Ukraine]], as well as what was in the minds of [[US]] officials.
According to the ''[[Washington Post]]'',<ref>https://archive.ph/GmW5m#selection-1169.4-1169.55</ref> US and Ukrainian militaries had conducted war games and had anticipated that an advance would be accompanied by heavy losses. But when the real-world fatalities mounted, the ''Post'' reported, “Ukraine chose to stem the losses on the battlefield”.
This caused a rift between the Ukrainians and their [[Western alliance|Western backers]], who were frustrated at Ukrainians’ desire to keep their people alive. A mid-July 2023 ''[[New York Times]]'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/14/us/politics/ukraine-war-cluster-munitions.html</ref> reported that US officials were privately frustrated that Ukraine had become too afraid of dying to fight effectively. The officials worried that Ukrainian commanders “feared casualties among their ranks”, and had “reverted to old habits” rather than “pressing harder”. A later ''Times'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html</ref> repeated [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]’s worries that Ukrainians were too “casualty-averse”.
This caused a rift between the Ukrainians and their [[Western alliance|Western backers]], who were frustrated at Ukrainians’ desire to keep their people alive. A mid-July 2023 ''[[New York Times]]'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/14/us/politics/ukraine-war-cluster-munitions.html</ref> reported that US officials were privately frustrated that Ukraine had become too afraid of dying to fight effectively. The officials worried that Ukrainian commanders “feared casualties among their ranks”, and had “reverted to old habits” rather than “pressing harder”. A later ''Times'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html</ref> repeated [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]’s worries that Ukrainians were too “casualty-averse”.