Changes

==Background and operational planning==

==Background and operational planning==

{{See also|2022 Istanbul peace negotiations}}

{{See also|2022 Istanbul peace negotiations}}

The [[U.S. military]] rolled out a whole new initiative tasked specifically with integrating “open source intelligence” into its planning, giddy with possibility at the first, seemingly endlessly fruitful, ‘successes’ of this partnership with rabid pro-UA OSINT autists in the opening stanza of the war.

The [[Pentagon|US military]] rolled out a whole new initiative tasked specifically with integrating “open source intelligence” into its planning, giddy with possibility at the first, seemingly endlessly fruitful, ‘successes’ of this partnership with rabid pro-UA OSINT autists in the opening stanza of the war.

However, this famously proved catastrophic when reports began to trickle out that much of [[US]]/[[CIA]] mission planning for the grand Zaporozhye CounterOffensive was in fact based on outdated OSINT maps of Russia’s defenses. In short: they planned the offensive around [[Twitter]] maps made in [[MS Paint]] by light-shunning basement dwellers like Andrew Perpetua.<ref>https://www.thescore.com/mlb/news/2364664</ref> Once the Ukrainian spearhead actually reached the lines, they realized things were quite different than their Twitter intelligence had assured, because Russian forces were hip to their over reliance on such unhygienic 'data' habits, and proceeded to modify many of the defensive structures and positions.

However, this famously proved catastrophic when reports began to trickle out that much of [[US]]/[[CIA]] mission planning for the grand Zaporozhye CounterOffensive was in fact based on outdated OSINT maps of Russia’s defenses. In short: they planned the offensive around [[Twitter]] maps made in [[MS Paint]] by light-shunning basement dwellers like Andrew Perpetua.<ref>https://www.thescore.com/mlb/news/2364664</ref> Once the Ukrainian spearhead actually reached the lines, they realized things were quite different than their Twitter intelligence had assured, because Russian forces were hip to their over reliance on such unhygienic 'data' habits, and proceeded to modify many of the defensive structures and positions.