Changes

{{See also|Central Intelligence Agency#Maidan regime}}

{{See also|Central Intelligence Agency#Maidan regime}}

[[File:Budanov.PNG|right|250px|thumb|[[Kyrylo Budanov]].<ref>https://kurtnimmo.substack.com/p/ukraines-intelligence-boss-predicts</ref> By May 2023, this person was considered to be the top [[Nazi]] on the Russian Investigative Committees' most wanted list for [[terrorist]] activities.]]

[[File:Budanov.PNG|right|250px|thumb|[[Kyrylo Budanov]].<ref>https://kurtnimmo.substack.com/p/ukraines-intelligence-boss-predicts</ref> By May 2023, this person was considered to be the top [[Nazi]] on the Russian Investigative Committees' most wanted list for [[terrorist]] activities.]]

''[[The Washington Post]]'' reported that from 2015 on the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on espionage and active measures operations against Russia.<ref>[https://archive.ph/RMFzQ#selection-1881.181-1881.377 Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia], By Greg Miller and Isabelle Khurshudyan, ''Washington Post'', October 23, 2023</ref> F It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA that the CIA provided him an armored vehicle.

''[[The Washington Post]]'' reported that from 2015 on the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on espionage and active measures operations against Russia.<ref>[https://archive.ph/RMFzQ#selection-1881.181-1881.377 Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia], By Greg Miller and Isabelle Khurshudyan, ''Washington Post'', October 23, 2023</ref> It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] (SBU) was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence.  

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the Americans.

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the [[American]]s.

Concerned that the GUR’s aging facilities were likely compromised by Russian intelligence, the CIA paid for new headquarters buildings for the GUR’s “spetsnaz” paramilitary division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic espionage. Troves of data were relayed through the new CIA-built facility back to Washington, where they were scrutinized by CIA and [[NSA]] analysts.

Concerned that the GUR’s aging facilities were likely compromised by Russian intelligence, the CIA paid for new headquarters buildings for the GUR’s "[[spetsnaz]]" [[paramilitary]] division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic [[espionage]]. Troves of data were relayed through the new CIA-built facility back to [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]], where they were scrutinized by CIA and [[NSA]] analysts.

The GUR had also developed networks of sources in Russia’s security apparatus. The CIA was permitted to have direct contact with agents recruited and run by Ukrainian intelligence.

The GUR had also developed networks of sources in Russia’s security apparatus. The CIA was permitted to have direct contact with agents recruited and run by Ukrainian intelligence.