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| | {{See also|Central Intelligence Agency#Maidan regime}} | | {{See also|Central Intelligence Agency#Maidan regime}} |
| | [[File:Budanov.PNG|right|250px|thumb|29 year old GUR head [[Kyrylo Budanov]].<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20230105152355/https://kurtnimmo.substack.com/p/ukraines-intelligence-boss-predicts Ukraine’s Intelligence Boss Predicts Further Attacks Deep Inside Russia], Kurt Nimmo, January 3, 2023. </ref> Due to his youth and personal ambition, Budanov quickly gained a reputation for reckless exuberance. By May 2023 Budanov was the prime target of the Russian Investigative Committees [[denazification]] program for his [[terrorist]] activities.]] | | [[File:Budanov.PNG|right|250px|thumb|29 year old GUR head [[Kyrylo Budanov]].<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20230105152355/https://kurtnimmo.substack.com/p/ukraines-intelligence-boss-predicts Ukraine’s Intelligence Boss Predicts Further Attacks Deep Inside Russia], Kurt Nimmo, January 3, 2023. </ref> Due to his youth and personal ambition, Budanov quickly gained a reputation for reckless exuberance. By May 2023 Budanov was the prime target of the Russian Investigative Committees [[denazification]] program for his [[terrorist]] activities.]] |
| − | ''[[The Washington Post]]'' reported that from 2015 on the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of Ukrainian military intelligence, the [[GUR]]. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on espionage and active measures operations against Russia.<ref>[https://archive.ph/RMFzQ#selection-1881.181-1881.377 Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia], By Greg Miller and Isabelle Khurshudyan, ''Washington Post'', October 23, 2023</ref> It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] (SBU) was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. | + | ''[[The Washington Post]]'' reported that from 2015 on the [[CIA]] embarked on an extensive transformation of Ukrainian military intelligence, the [[GUR]]. Unlike its American counterpart the [[DIA]], the GUR is not simply an information gathering and analytical organization, but is also engaged in covert activities (or active measures) such as murder, political assassinations, bombings, etc. |
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| | + | With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on espionage and active measures operations against Russia.<ref>[https://archive.ph/RMFzQ#selection-1881.181-1881.377 Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia], By Greg Miller and Isabelle Khurshudyan, ''Washington Post'', October 23, 2023</ref> It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] (SBU) was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. |
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| | The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the [[American]]s. | | The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the [[American]]s. |