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| | [[File:Flag of Russia.png|right|thumbnail|250px|The flag of [[Russia]] ]] | | [[File:Flag of Russia.png|right|thumbnail|250px|The flag of [[Russia]] ]] |
| | Russian [[GDP]] nominally rose more than any [[G7]] country in 2023. The average Russian household ended the year with about 18% more money in the [[bank]] than a year earlier. Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-controlled bank, posted a 5.5-fold year-on-year net profit jump to a record high of 1.5 trillion rubles (USD $16.3 billion). The defense industry employs 3.5 million people and many factories have doubled their workforce since the beginning of the [[SMO]]. The economic boom is result of defense [[stimulus]] spending, [[Keynesian economics]], a government [[deficit]]s. Compared to the [[United States]], Russia is a piker in the debt markets. The U.S. gas $35 trillion [[national debt]] and growing), nearly a $1 trillion dollar defense budget, does not produce tanks, failed to produce a functional [[hypersonic missile]], incapable of matching Russia’s output of [[artillery]] shells, and has become largely a service economy. | | Russian [[GDP]] nominally rose more than any [[G7]] country in 2023. The average Russian household ended the year with about 18% more money in the [[bank]] than a year earlier. Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-controlled bank, posted a 5.5-fold year-on-year net profit jump to a record high of 1.5 trillion rubles (USD $16.3 billion). The defense industry employs 3.5 million people and many factories have doubled their workforce since the beginning of the [[SMO]]. The economic boom is result of defense [[stimulus]] spending, [[Keynesian economics]], a government [[deficit]]s. Compared to the [[United States]], Russia is a piker in the debt markets. The U.S. gas $35 trillion [[national debt]] and growing), nearly a $1 trillion dollar defense budget, does not produce tanks, failed to produce a functional [[hypersonic missile]], incapable of matching Russia’s output of [[artillery]] shells, and has become largely a service economy. |
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| | + | == Russia's labor crisis == |
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| | + | ''See also:'' [[Russia's labor crisis]] |
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| | + | The Center for European Policy Analysis reported on March 9, 2024: |
| | + | {{Cquote|Towards the end of last year, experts from the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences estimated that [[Russia]] faced a shortfall of nearly 5 million workers in 2023, which is already impeding economic growth. The total workforce is a little under 74 million. |
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| | + | With perhaps a million Russians, including many working-age men, having fled the country, with more than 300,000 dead or wounded in Ukraine, with more than a million men in the military, and a fertility rate of 1.5 — far below the so-called replacement rate of 2.1 — the country simply cannot meet its needs. |
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| | + | The head of the Central Bank is among those describing it as the country’s most serious problem, hardly surprising when unemployment is just 2.9% and the vacancy rate is 6.8%. |
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| | + | This scarcity is particularly pronounced in the manufacturing, construction, and transportation sectors. According to recruitment agencies and company management, the workforce deficit will worsen in 2024. |
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| | + | Beyond skilled professionals, Russia struggles to meet even basic labor demands, including those for military purposes. Increasingly, schoolchildren and students are being enlisted for war-related tasks. Just last week, a major investigation revealed how minors as young as 14 are involved in activities for the “Mayor’s Labor Unit” in Krasnoyarsk, weaving camouflage nets and preparing parcels for frontline needs.<ref>[https://cepa.org/article/russia-seeks-africans-to-fix-its-workforce-shortages/ Russia Seeks Africans to Fix its Workforce Shortages], Center for European Policy Analysis, March 9, 2024</ref>}} |
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| | == Russia's business environment == | | == Russia's business environment == |
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