Changes

==Biography==

==Biography==

After four years of active duty, Robert MacLean (born on March 8, 1970, in [[Torrejon Air Base]], [[Madrid, Spain]]) elected not to reenlist and was honorably discharged from the [[U.S. Air Force]].  MacLean then entered the [[U.S. Border Patrol]] and served almost six years until he transferred to the U.S. [[Federal Air Marshal Service]] (FAMS) immediately after the [[September 11, 2001 attacks]].  MacLean was in the first FAMS class to graduate after the [[September 11]], [[2001]] Attacks. <ref>[http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2331806 Air marshal’s firing prompts whistleblower suit], Stephen Losey, ''Federal Times'', November 7, 2006</ref>

After four years of active duty, Robert MacLean (born on March 8, 1970, in [[Torrejon Air Base]], [[Madrid, Spain]]) elected not to reenlist and was honorably discharged from the [[U.S. Air Force]].  MacLean then entered the [[U.S. Border Patrol]] and served almost six years until he transferred to the U.S. [[Transporation Security Administration]] (TSA) immediately after the [[September 11, 2001 attacks]].  MacLean was in the first FAMS class to graduate after the [[September 11]], [[2001]] Attacks. <ref>[http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2331806 Air marshal’s firing prompts whistleblower suit], Stephen Losey, ''Federal Times'', November 7, 2006</ref>

==Aviation Security [[Whistleblower]]==

==Aviation Security [[Whistleblower]]==

In July 2003, U.S. Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Robert MacLean tried to blow the whistle within the [[Department of Homeland Security]] (DHS) on a plan to reduce air marshal coverage of nonstop, long distance flights amidst heightened warnings <ref>[http://youtube.com/watch?v=Wi36t4B2OV4 Federal Air Marshal Fired for Exposing Dangerous Policy], ''CNN Lou Dobbs'', November 20, 2006</ref> based on a July 26, 2006 DHS Advisory describing intelligence of an [[al-Qaeda]] suicide hijack plan. <ref>[http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2003/07/30-hijackings.htm U.S. warns of 9/11-style plane attacks], Mimi Hall and Kevin Johnson, ''USA Today'', August 1, 2003</ref>  

In July 2003, U.S. Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Robert MacLean tried to blow the whistle within the TSA on a plan to reduce air marshal coverage of nonstop, long distance flights amidst heightened warnings <ref>[http://youtube.com/watch?v=Wi36t4B2OV4 Federal Air Marshal Fired for Exposing Dangerous Policy], ''CNN Lou Dobbs'', November 20, 2006</ref> based on a July 26, 2006 DHS Advisory describing intelligence of an [[al-Qaeda]] suicide hijack plan. <ref>[http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2003/07/30-hijackings.htm U.S. warns of 9/11-style plane attacks], Mimi Hall and Kevin Johnson, ''USA Today'', August 1, 2003</ref>  

The plan would exploit a U.S. immigration loophole enabling a terrorist, without a U.S. visa, to take a flight from a country with less-stringent security to a U.S. airport and roam that U.S. airport during a layover before taking a second connecting flight to the destination country.  Once inside a U.S. airport, terrorists would smuggle weapons onto aircraft by hiding weapons inside camera equipment and children's toys.  During flight, the terrorists would overpower the crew, take control, and fly the hijacked aircraft into U.S. east coast targets. <ref>[http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64871-2003Jul29?language=printer Memo Warns Of New Plots To Hijack Jets], Sara Kehaulani Goo and Susan Schmidt, ''The Washington Post'', July 30, 2003</ref>  The plan was in direct violation of the [[Aviation & Transportation Security Act]] (Public Law 107–71), Title 49 of the [[United States Code]] Section 44917:  “Deployment of Federal Air Marshals... [on] nonstop, long distance flights, such as those targeted on [[September 11]], [[2001]], should be a priority.”<ref>[http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode49/usc_sec_49_00044917----000-.html 2001 Aviation & Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107–71)], ''United States Code'', November 19, 2001</ref>   

The plan would exploit a U.S. immigration loophole enabling a terrorist, without a U.S. visa, to take a flight from a country with less-stringent security to a U.S. airport and roam that U.S. airport during a layover before taking a second connecting flight to the destination country.  Once inside a U.S. airport, terrorists would smuggle weapons onto aircraft by hiding weapons inside camera equipment and children's toys.  During flight, the terrorists would overpower the crew, take control, and fly the hijacked aircraft into U.S. east coast targets. <ref>[http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64871-2003Jul29?language=printer Memo Warns Of New Plots To Hijack Jets], Sara Kehaulani Goo and Susan Schmidt, ''The Washington Post'', July 30, 2003</ref>  The plan was in direct violation of the [[Aviation & Transportation Security Act]] (Public Law 107–71), Title 49 of the [[United States Code]] Section 44917:  “Deployment of Federal Air Marshals... [on] nonstop, long distance flights, such as those targeted on [[September 11]], [[2001]], should be a priority.”<ref>[http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode49/usc_sec_49_00044917----000-.html 2001 Aviation & Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107–71)], ''United States Code'', November 19, 2001</ref>   

On August 31, 2006, a year after proposing to terminate MacLean, the TSA asserted that the July 2003 information he disclosed was SSI. <ref>[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/10/ap/government/main2787504.shtml U.S. Labels 2003 Leaked Memo 'Sensitive'], Larry Margasak, ''Associated Press'', May 10, 2007</ref>  TSA labeled MacLean's disclosure as SSI over three years after it was made public. <ref>[http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/MacLeanFinalOrderSSI.pdf TSA's August 31, 2006 Final Order on Sensitive Security Information], Andrew Colsky, ''Transportation Security Administration'', August 31, 2006</ref>  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has criticized the DHS for failing to have clear policies and oversight of its SSI designations, and using vague standards for its use. <ref>[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05677.pdf Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information], Steven J. Pecinovsky, ''Government Accountability Office'', June 1, 2005</ref>  If DHS and the [[Department of Justice]] (DOJ) succeed with their removal of MacLean, these pseudo-classification markings will be abused to retroactively mark information as "sensitive" to then retaliate against whistleblowers, possibly decreasing the flow of critical information to the public. <ref>[http://pogo.org/p/government/rmaclean-dhs.html Retroactive Labeling in Robert MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security], Nick Schwellenbach, ''Project On Government Oversight'', May 5, 2007</ref>

On August 31, 2006, a year after proposing to terminate MacLean, the TSA asserted that the July 2003 information he disclosed was SSI. <ref>[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/10/ap/government/main2787504.shtml U.S. Labels 2003 Leaked Memo 'Sensitive'], Larry Margasak, ''Associated Press'', May 10, 2007</ref>  TSA labeled MacLean's disclosure as SSI over three years after it was made public. <ref>[http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/MacLeanFinalOrderSSI.pdf TSA's August 31, 2006 Final Order on Sensitive Security Information], Andrew Colsky, ''Transportation Security Administration'', August 31, 2006</ref>  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has criticized the DHS for failing to have clear policies and oversight of its SSI designations, and using vague standards for its use. <ref>[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05677.pdf Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information], Steven J. Pecinovsky, ''Government Accountability Office'', June 1, 2005</ref>  If DHS and the [[Department of Justice]] (DOJ) succeed with their removal of MacLean, these pseudo-classification markings will be abused to retroactively mark information as "sensitive" to then retaliate against whistleblowers, possibly decreasing the flow of critical information to the public. <ref>[http://pogo.org/p/government/rmaclean-dhs.html Retroactive Labeling in Robert MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security], Nick Schwellenbach, ''Project On Government Oversight'', May 5, 2007</ref>

==Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice's Arguments==

==Transporation Security Administration and Department of Justice's Arguments==

DHS and DOJ make four general arguments:  1) That Robert MacLean was trained in the safeguarding of SSI and that the information he disclosed did not require any markings despite [[Code of Federal Regulations]] (CFRs) that mandate the contrary.  2) He caused the TSA to disrupt their operations in order to cancel their plan to remove FAMs from nonstop, long distance flights.  3) Had TSA decided continue with their plan despite public and congressional outrage, MacLean's disclosure would have alerted all terrorists that nonstop, long distance flight would not be staffed with FAMs. (4) Finally, the government argues that front-line law enforcement field officers do not have the authority, education or experience to determine if policies endanger public safety and national security - that such determinations can only be made by the agency's senior executives.

TSA and DOJ make four general arguments:  1) That Robert MacLean was trained in the safeguarding of SSI and that the information he disclosed did not require any markings despite [[Code of Federal Regulations]] (CFRs) that mandate the contrary.  2) He caused the TSA to disrupt their operations in order to cancel their plan to remove FAMs from nonstop, long distance flights.  3) Had TSA decided continue with their plan despite public and congressional outrage, MacLean's disclosure would have alerted all terrorists that nonstop, long distance flight would not be staffed with FAMs. (4) Finally, the government argues that front-line law enforcement field officers do not have the authority, education or experience to determine if policies endanger public safety and national security - that such determinations can only be made by the agency's senior executives.

==References==

==References==