Changes

On taling office Nixon and Kissinger were briefed on the US nuclear war plan, the [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the John Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.<ref>William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(3): 34-78. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]; Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," ''Journal of Strategic Studies,'' Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 37-71; Scott Sagan, ''Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security'' (1989).</ref>

On taling office Nixon and Kissinger were briefed on the US nuclear war plan, the [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the John Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.<ref>William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(3): 34-78. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]; Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," ''Journal of Strategic Studies,'' Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 37-71; Scott Sagan, ''Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security'' (1989).</ref>

===Détente with Soviet Union and China===

===Détente with Soviet Union and China===

Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other . Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first [[Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]] (SALT I). At the same time Kissinger successfully engineered a rapprochement with Communist China, leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref>Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref>  

Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other . Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first [[Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]] (SALT I). At the same time Kissinger successfully engineered a [[rapprochement]] with Communist China, leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref>Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref>  

Aware that China and the Soviet Union were at sword's point, with rival claims to be the true Communists, Kissinger used the "Soviet card" to win over China by playing up the Soviet threat to the Chinese as a way of promoting closer relations with China. He even hinted at a US-China alliance to oppose the Soviets, and, with Nixon's trips to Moscow, hinted that China had better come to terms lest the US form an alliance with Moscow. The tactics worked, resulting in a friendly relationship with both Beijing and Moscow. As part of the détente, both powers reduced or ended their aid to North Vietnam, thus allowing a settlement of the [[Vietnam War]].<ref>Evelyn Goh, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(3): 475-502.</ref>

Aware that China and the Soviet Union were at sword's point, with rival claims to be the true Communists, Kissinger used the "Soviet card" to win over China by playing up the Soviet threat to the Chinese as a way of promoting closer relations with China. He even hinted at a US-China alliance to oppose the Soviets, and, with Nixon's trips to Moscow, hinted that China had better come to terms lest the US form an alliance with Moscow. The tactics worked, resulting in a friendly relationship with both Beijing and Moscow. As part of the détente, both powers reduced or ended their aid to North Vietnam, thus allowing a settlement of the [[Vietnam War]].<ref>Evelyn Goh, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(3): 475-502.</ref>