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| − | ''Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo'' is a challenge to [[Chevron Doctrine]] pending before the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] in its 2022-23 Term. | + | ''Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo'' is a challenge to [[Chevron Doctrine]] pending before the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] in its 2022-23 Term. It is one of two consolidated cases involving companies fishing in the North Atlantic. Justice [[Ketanji Brown Jackson]] did not participate in one of the cases, due to her involvement as an appellate judge during that case's appeal. |
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| | The Supreme Court granted cert in 2023 on only the second of the Questions Presented: | | The Supreme Court granted cert in 2023 on only the second of the Questions Presented: |
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| − | The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides | + | The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to “carry” federal observers onboard to enforce the agency’s myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in only three circumstances (none of which were applicable to either of the companies involved in this case), the MSA requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations (although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel’s haul; however, foreign vessels '''''must''''' have a federal observer onboard at all times while fishing in US waters). |
| − | that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to “carry” federal observers onboard to enforce the agency’s myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations—although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel’s haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency. | |
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| − | The questions presented are: | + | The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency. |
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| − | 1. Whether, under a proper application of Chevron, the MSA implicitly grants NMFS the power | + | The questions presented were: |
| − | to force domestic vessels to pay the salaries of the monitors they must carry. | + | |
| | + | 1. Whether, under a proper application of Chevron, the MSA implicitly grants NMFS the power to force domestic vessels to pay the salaries of the monitors they must carry. (The Court did not grant certiorari on this question.) |
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| | 2. Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency. | | 2. Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency. |
| − | [[category:United States Supreme Court Cases]] | + | |
| | + | The court, in its opinion, overruled ''Chevron''. The verdict was 6-3 for one company and 6-2 (with Justice Jackson recusing as mentioned above) on the other. |
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| | + | ==External Links== |
| | + | *[https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf Text of Opinion] |
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| | + | [[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]] |