| − | {{cquote|And some Presidential conduct for example, speaking to and on behalf of the American people, see Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 701 (2018) certainly can qualify as official even when not obviously connected to a particular constitutional or statutory provision. For those reasons, the immunity we have recognized '''''extends to the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibilities''''', covering actions so long as they are not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority. Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 755-756 (noting that we have refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support). | + | {{cquote|And some Presidential conduct for example, speaking to and on behalf of the American people, see ''Trump v. Hawaii'', 585 U. S. 667, 701 (2018) certainly can qualify as official even when not obviously connected to a particular constitutional or statutory provision. For those reasons, the immunity we have recognized '''''extends to the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibilities''''', covering actions so long as they are not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority. ''Blassingame v. Trump'', 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted); see ''Fitzgerald'', 457 U. S., at 755-756 (noting that we have refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support). |
| − | In dividing official from unofficial conduct, '''''courts may not inquire into the President's motives'''''. Such an inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II interests that immunity seeks to protect. Indeed, [i]t would seriously cripple [*42] the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government if [i]n exercising the functions of his office, the President was under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 745 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896)). We thus rejected such inquiries in Fitzgerald. The plaintiff there contended that he was dismissed from the Air Force for retaliatory reasons. See 457 U. S., at 733-741, 756. The Air Force responded that the reorganization that led to Fitzgerald's dismissal was undertaken to promote efficiency. Ibid. Because under Fitzgerald's theory an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided, we rejected the theory, observing that [i]nquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. Id., at 756. [B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 817-818 (1982). | + | In dividing official from unofficial conduct, '''''courts may not inquire into the President's motives'''''. Such an inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II interests that immunity seeks to protect. Indeed, [i]t would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government if [i]n exercising the functions of his office, the President was under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 745 (quoting ''Spalding v. Vilas'', 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896)). We thus rejected such inquiries in ''Fitzgerald''. The plaintiff there contended that he was dismissed from the Air Force for retaliatory reasons. See 457 U. S., at 733-741, 756. The Air Force responded that the reorganization that led to Fitzgerald's dismissal was undertaken to promote efficiency. Ibid. Because under Fitzgerald's theory an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided, we rejected the theory, observing that [i]nquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. Id., at 756. [B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. ''Harlow v. Fitzgerald'', 457 U. S. 800, 817-818 (1982). |