Changes

==Origins==

==Origins==

Frustrated by the rearmament of [[West Germany]] and the success of [[NATO]], the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "[[National liberation movement|national liberation]]" in the third world. The Communist logic, following [[Lenin]], was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the [[Third World]]. Without that exploitation capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro- Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America—run by and for the benefit of giant corporations—had succeeded [[fascism]] as most dangerous agent of [[imperialism]]. [[Moscow]]'s differences with [[Beijing]] on Marxist theory meant that it had to compete for influence among [[leftist]]s: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with [[NATO]].

Frustrated by the rearmament of [[West Germany]] and the success of [[NATO]], the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "[[National liberation movement|national liberation]]" in the third world. The Communist logic, following [[Lenin]], was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the [[Third World]]. Without that exploitation, capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro-Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America—run by and for the benefit of giant corporations—had succeeded [[fascism]] as the most dangerous agent of [[imperialism]]. [[Moscow]]'s differences with [[Beijing]] on Marxist theory meant that it had to compete for influence among [[leftist]]s: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third-world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with [[NATO]].

In June 1961 Khrushchev and Kennedy met [[Vienna]]. Reporter James Reston of the ''[[New York Times]]'' wrote "Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev....I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time," Reston reported. Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.<ref>https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/187067191/</ref>

In June 1961 Khrushchev and Kennedy met [[Vienna]]. Reporter James Reston of the ''[[New York Times]]'' wrote "Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev....I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time," Reston reported. Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.<ref>https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/187067191/</ref>

==Cuba==

==Cuba==

Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s first important opportunity to employ the strategy came in 1962, when the US seemed on the verge of rolling back the first pro-Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba. [[Fidel Castro]] rubbed Americans the wrong way. In the first months after the bearded guerrilla captain came to power in 1959, Washington was willing to overlook reports that he was a true Marxist–Leninist, not merely some agrarian reformer. By 1960 Cuba had become a Soviet satellite; and President [[John F. Kennedy]] ordered the CIA to destabilize his regime. The invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]] was a total failure.  Embarrassed, Kennedy cut off dollar trade with Cuba, while the CIA stepped up its sabotage; rumors abounded about a new invasion, this time by the Marines. The rumors were in fact disinformation designed to frighten and weaken Castro. The economic blockade tightened.

Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s first important opportunity to employ the strategy came in 1962, when the US seemed on the verge of rolling back the first pro-Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba. [[Fidel Castro]] rubbed Americans the wrong way. In the first months after the bearded guerrilla captain came to power in 1959, Washington was willing to overlook reports that he was a true Marxist–Leninist, not merely some agrarian reformer. By 1960 Cuba had become a Soviet satellite; President [[John F. Kennedy]] ordered the CIA to destabilize his regime. The invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]] was a total failure.  Embarrassed, Kennedy cut off dollar trade with Cuba, while the CIA stepped up its sabotage; rumors abounded about a new invasion, this time by the Marines. The rumors were in fact disinformation designed to frighten and weaken Castro. The economic blockade tightened.

As a loyal Democrat who had learned the "lesson" of Korea, Kennedy believed in the [[containment]] strategy, and rejected [[rollback]]. Furthermore, the Bay of Pigs fiasco had taught the young president a bitter lesson: no matter how much he personally empathized with the sufferings of the Cuban people (who were fellow Catholics), he needed to act in terms of a cold-blooded analysis of the American national interest. The CIA threats were not a prelude to rollback but a substitute.

As a loyal Democrat who had learned the "lesson" of Korea, Kennedy believed in the [[containment]] strategy and rejected [[rollback]]. Furthermore, the Bay of Pigs fiasco had taught the young president a bitter lesson: no matter how much he personally empathized with the sufferings of the Cuban people (who were fellow Catholics), he needed to act in terms of a cold-blooded analysis of the American national interest. The CIA threats were not a prelude to rollback but a substitute.

==Havana and Moscow==

==Havana and Moscow==

===Sending nuclear weapons===

===Sending nuclear weapons===

Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control.  [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref>James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [https://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions—including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. [[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]]

Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control.  [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref>James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [https://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars worth of munitions—including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. [[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]]

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met regularly before the crisis. At its critical September 19, 1962, meeting it decided that the intelligence contained no evidence that the Soviets had sent nuclear missiles to Cuba, and  

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met regularly before the crisis. At its critical September 19, 1962, meeting it decided that the intelligence contained no evidence that the Soviets had sent nuclear missiles to Cuba, and  

it unanimously concluded that on balance they would not do so in the future.<ref>USIB had five reasons, all mistaken. The likelihood of discovery was high. Second, they knew the U.S. would react strongly. Third, the missiles would reduce but not end Soviet strategic inferiority. Fourth, Moscow had never in the past sent nuclear weapons outside their own borders. Finally, Castro was not seen as trustworthy or stable by the Kremlin. Ergo, there would be no missiles. CIA director John McCone, dissented but had no counter evidence. McCone, a businessman, had no expertise in intelligence, Cuba or the Kremlin, and undercut his credibility be departing for a month-long honeymoon as the crisis began to escalate; his warnings were ignored. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 32-33.</ref>  Kennedy trusted the USIB and repeatedly denied there were Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."<ref>Quoted in [http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,874434,00.html ''Time'' Sept. 14, 1962]</ref>  

it unanimously concluded that on balance they would not do so in the future.<ref>USIB had five reasons, all mistaken. The likelihood of discovery was high. Second, they knew the U.S. would react strongly. Third, the missiles would reduce but not end Soviet strategic inferiority. Fourth, Moscow had never in the past sent nuclear weapons outside their own borders. Finally, Castro was not seen as trustworthy or stable by the Kremlin. Ergo, there would be no missiles. CIA director John McCone dissented but had no counter-evidence. McCone, a businessman, had no expertise in intelligence, Cuba or the Kremlin, and undercut his credibility be departing for a month-long honeymoon as the crisis began to escalate; his warnings were ignored. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 32-33.</ref>  Kennedy trusted the USIB and repeatedly denied there were Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."<ref>Quoted in [http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,874434,00.html ''Time'' Sept. 14, 1962]</ref>  

[[Image:Cuba62b.jpg|thumb|300px|Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962]]

[[Image:Cuba62b.jpg|thumb|300px|Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962]]

==Photography==

==Photography==

[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]

[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]

Many rumors of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken,  Photography was essential in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

Many rumors of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken,  Photography was essential in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above the range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high-altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Burgioni, ''Eyeball To Eyeball'' (1993)</ref>

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors to lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Burgioni, ''Eyeball To Eyeball'' (1993)</ref>

===Photographic Interpretation===

===Photographic Interpretation===

===Low Level Photography===

===Low Level Photography===

Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low-level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low-level flights provided critical information but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

==Strategic balance==

==Strategic balance==

At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).  

At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast, America had far more weapons capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).  

===Jupiters===

===Jupiters===

In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref>NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.  

In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but were due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5-megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes' notice; the comparable Soviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref>NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.  

==American options==

==American options==

ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties (killed and wounded) were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)<ref>for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref>

ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally, the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties (killed and wounded) were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Ultimately Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)<ref>for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref>

 

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==

[[Image:SS-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|350px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]

[[Image:SS-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|350px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]

The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States.  U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States.  

The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was an MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States.  U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States.  

 

On October 27, 1962, a U-2 photographic mission over Cuba was shot down by a Soviet SA-2 SAM missile. Some on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. Kennedy decided to wait.

On October 27, 1962, a U-2 photographic mission over Cuba was shot down by a Soviet SA-2 SAM missile. Some on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. Kennedy decided to wait.

When Moscow failed to respond he privately gave the Kremlin a 48-hour ultimatum to remove all the missiles; to allow Khrushchev to save face he secretly suggested a trade for the Jupiters. The next step would either have been a complete blockade, or perhaps the air strike option. People were terrified but rallied behind the president.<ref>Alice L. George,  ''Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis.'' (2003).</ref>

When Moscow failed to respond he privately gave the Kremlin a 48-hour ultimatum to remove all the missiles; to allow Khrushchev to save face he secretly suggested a trade for the Jupiters. The next step would either have been a complete blockade, or perhaps the air strike option. People were terrified but rallied behind the president.<ref>Alice L. George,  ''Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis.'' (2003).</ref>

===The United Nations===

===The United Nations===

===Jupiters in Turkey===

===Jupiters in Turkey===

The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington Moscow, the United States prepared its final offer. Robert Kennedy paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin regarding the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]]; both realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. Even before the deal, however, America had already considered removing the Jupiter IRBM stations from Turkey anyways due to their being rendered obsolete from the advent of submarines with nuclear launch capabilities.<ref>Leaf, Johnathan. ''The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Sixties''. p153.<br />"''Eventually, the Soviets agreed to dismantle the missiles in exchange for American pledges not to invade Cuba and to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey at a later date. The batteries in Turkey were obsolete anyway, made redundant by the enhanced capabilities of new American nuclear subs.''"</ref>

The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington and Moscow, the United States prepared its final offer. Robert Kennedy paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin regarding the Jupiter-type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]]; both realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as the world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. Even before the deal, however, America had already considered removing the Jupiter IRBM stations from Turkey anyways due to their being rendered obsolete by the advent of submarines with nuclear launch capabilities.<ref>Leaf, Johnathan. ''The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Sixties''. p153.<br />"''Eventually, the Soviets agreed to dismantle the missiles in exchange for American pledges not to invade Cuba and to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey at a later date. The batteries in Turkey were obsolete anyway, made redundant by the enhanced capabilities of new American nuclear subs.''"</ref>

==Khrushchev blinks==

==Khrushchev blinks==

The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.

==Aftermath==

==Aftermath==

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous point in post-World War II history; neither side wanted to escalate the conflict, but both realized that it could get out of control, especially if local commanders made some mistakes. Kennedy demonstrated firmness in crisis, and avoided serious losses in the midterm elections. Ignoring the military chain of command, he established the pattern of command-post micromanagement over military matters that [[Lyndon Johnson]] after 1964 expanded during the Vietnam war. Kennedy's refusal to consult Congress enhanced the "imperial presidency."  

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous point in post-World War II history; neither side wanted to escalate the conflict, but both realized that it could get out of control, especially if local commanders made some mistakes. Kennedy was perceived, not necessarily correctly, as demonstrating firmness in the face of a crisis, and avoided serious losses in the midterm elections. Ignoring the military chain of command, he established the pattern of command-post micromanagement over military matters that [[Lyndon Johnson]] after 1964 expanded during the Vietnam War. Kennedy's refusal to consult Congress enhanced the "imperial presidency."  

Conservative Republicans, dissatisfied that Castro had escaped the noose, rallied behind Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] and editor [[William F. Buckley]]. They redirected the GOP to an aggressive [[rollback]] policy of the sort represented by the rejected invasion option.  

Conservative Republicans, dissatisfied that Castro had escaped the noose, rallied behind Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] and editor [[William F. Buckley]]. They redirected the GOP to an aggressive [[rollback]] policy of the sort represented by the rejected invasion option.  

Realizing how close they had come to war, Kennedy and Khrushchev became friendlier in public. But Khrushchev's days were numbered after the humiliating backdown. They signed a test ban treaty that eliminated nuclear testing above ground or in space; the treaty was primarily designed to hobble China and other countries trying to build their first bombs. Defense of the US no longer relied on field armies, but on a triad of strategic forces: 1,054 land-based ICBMs, 650 submarine-based SLBMs, and 400 B-52 bombers.  

Realizing how close they had come to war, Kennedy and Khrushchev became friendlier in public. But Khrushchev's days were numbered after the humiliating backdown. They signed a test ban treaty that eliminated nuclear testing above ground or in space; the treaty was primarily designed to hobble China and other countries trying to build their first bombs. Defense of the US no longer relied on field armies, but on a triad of strategic forces: 1,054 land-based ICBMs, 650 submarine-based SLBMs, and 400 B-52 bombers.  

The Kremlin vowed never again would Communism be humiliated by raw American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced with a less volatile, more systematic hardliner, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1906–82). Russia built its own submarines and SLBM, and speeded manufacture of ICBMs; by 1971 it had caught up with the US. The US response was to add multiple warheads (MIRV) to each missile; the number of strategic warheads thereby doubled from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 10,000 after 1976.  

The Kremlin vowed never again would Communism be humiliated by raw American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced with a less volatile, more systematic hardliner, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1906–82). Russia built its own submarines and SLBM, and speeded the manufacture of ICBMs; by 1971 it had caught up with the US. The US response was to add multiple warheads (MIRV) to each missile; the number of strategic warheads thereby doubled from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 10,000 after 1976.  

Che Guevara during the event attempted to have them launch nukes into the United States, and maintained he would have done it had Khrushchev not ordered them to stand down in a special issue of the Socialist newspaper ''The London Daily Worker''.<ref>London Daily Worker 1962<br />'''Che Guevara:''' “If the missiles had remained we would have used them against the very heart of the United States, including New York. We must never establish a peaceful coexistence.”</ref><ref>http://blog.victimsofcommunism.org/5-reasons-why-ches-not-cool/</ref><ref>https://www.theepochtimes.com/was-che-guevara-a-hero-or-murderer_2242312.html</ref>

Che Guevara during the event attempted to have them launch nukes into the United States, and maintained he would have done it had Khrushchev not ordered them to stand down in a special issue of the Socialist newspaper ''The London Daily Worker''.<ref>London Daily Worker 1962<br />'''Che Guevara:''' “If the missiles had remained we would have used them against the very heart of the United States, including New York. We must never establish a peaceful coexistence.”</ref><ref>http://blog.victimsofcommunism.org/5-reasons-why-ches-not-cool/</ref><ref>https://www.theepochtimes.com/was-che-guevara-a-hero-or-murderer_2242312.html</ref>

The incident also contributed to the [[Sino-Soviet split]]. China and the Maoists reacted by viewing the post-Stalinist Moscow leadership of the global Marxist revolution in the nuclear age as reckless. The communist monolith was broken over more than just how to implement Marxist theory. By 1964, China developed its own nuclear bomb and began developing its own foreign policy. But Washington and the CIA were slow to recognize the Sino-Soviet split and continued to view the worldwide communist movement as being directed from Moscow for another decade.

The incident also contributed to the [[Sino-Soviet split]]. China and the Maoists reacted by viewing the post-Stalinist Moscow leadership of the global Marxist revolution in the nuclear age as reckless. The communist monolith was broken over more than just how to implement Marxist theory. By 1964, China developed its own nuclear bomb and began developing its own foreign policy. However, Washington and the CIA were slow to recognize the Sino-Soviet split and continued to view the worldwide communist movement as being directed from Moscow for another decade.

Kennedy's removal of the Jupiters in Turkey, and his refusal to consult with any allies during the crisis, raised doubts in Germany about America's commitment to Berlin, led France to pull its forces out of NATO, and ruined a proposed multilateral nuclear force. The Europeans, increasingly prosperous, felt sufficiently well protected. They were annoyed when Washington wanted them to assume a larger fraction of defense costs, yet never consulted in critical emergencies. The Western alliance survived, but had been sorely wounded.  

Kennedy's removal of the Jupiters in Turkey, and his refusal to consult with any allies during the crisis, raised doubts in Germany about America's commitment to Berlin, led France to pull its forces out of NATO, and ruined a proposed multilateral nuclear force. The Europeans, increasingly prosperous, felt sufficiently well protected. They were annoyed when Washington wanted them to assume a larger fraction of defense costs, yet never consulted in critical emergencies. The Western alliance survived, but had been sorely wounded.  

Castro, was now immune from an American invasion, though the dollar embargo continued. He kept taking Moscow's subsidies until 1992, but independently launched an adventuresome program of subverting pro-capitalist governments throughout Latin America and Africa. Tens of thousands of Cuban combat troops and military advisers were sent shore up left-wing regimes as distant as Angola and Ethiopia, and as close as Nicaragua and Grenada. Hundreds of thousands of people would die in civil wars supported by Castro, and it would take the US three decades and tens of billions of dollars to finally (in 1992) neutralize his efforts.  

Castro, was now immune from an American invasion, though the dollar embargo continued. He kept taking Moscow's subsidies until 1992, but independently launched an adventuresome program of subverting pro-capitalist governments throughout Latin America and Africa. Tens of thousands of Cuban combat troops and military advisers were sent to shore up left-wing regimes as distant as Angola and Ethiopia, and as close as Nicaragua and Grenada. Hundreds of thousands of people would die in civil wars supported by Castro, and it would take the US three decades and tens of billions of dollars to finally (in 1992) neutralize his efforts.  

The economic blockade was briefly lifted by [[Barack Obama]] in 2016 as one of the latter's last attempts at pushing through his [[radical left-wing]] agenda on the United States, but was eventually brought back by [[Donald Trump]] in 2018.

The economic blockade was briefly lifted by [[Barack Obama]] in 2016 as one of the latter's last attempts at pushing through his [[radical left-wing]] agenda on the United States, but was eventually brought back by [[Donald Trump]] in 2018.

The Cubans refer to the "October Crisis," while the Soviets called it "the Caribbean crisis." This naming highlights three different views: (1) The Cubans see this as one of many crises; (2) The Soviets view it as a confrontation that took place in the Caribbean (thus deemphasizing Cuba's importance); and (3) the United States perceives this as a multidimensional time bomb with international consequences including the future of Berlin.<ref>James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, ''Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis'' (2002) pp. 247-8</ref>

Cubans refer to the "October Crisis," while Soviets called it "the Caribbean crisis." This naming highlights three different views: (1) Cubans view this as one of many crises; (2) Soviets viewed it as a confrontation that took place in the Caribbean (thus deemphasizing Cuba's importance); and (3) the United States perceives this as a multidimensional time bomb with international consequences including the future of Berlin.<ref>James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, ''Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis'' (2002) pp. 247-8</ref>

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==

===Lesson plans===

===Lesson plans===

* [http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=683  "The Missiles of October: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962" by John Moser and Lori Hahn (2006) from NEH EdSitement], very detailed lesson for grades 9-12, with links to primary documents

* [http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=683  "The Missiles of October: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962" by John Moser and Lori Hahn (2006) from NEH EdSitement], a very detailed lesson for grades 9-12, with links to primary documents

* [http://future.state.gov/educators/lessons/cuba/ Cuban Missile Crisis, middle school lesson plan from US State Department]

* [http://future.state.gov/educators/lessons/cuba/ Cuban Missile Crisis, middle school lesson plan from US State Department]