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The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states the following regarding recent developments in ontological arguments for the existence of God:
 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states the following regarding recent developments in ontological arguments for the existence of God:
 
{{cquote|In more recent times, [[Kurt Gödel]], Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm and [[Alvin Plantinga]] have all presented much-discussed ontological arguments which bear interesting connections to the earlier arguments of St. Anselm, [[Rene Descartes|Descartes]] and [[Gottfried Leibniz|Leibniz]]. Of these, the most interesting are those of Gödel and Plantinga; in these cases, however, it is unclear whether we should really say that these authors claim that the arguments are proofs of the existence of God.<ref>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/</ref>}}
 
{{cquote|In more recent times, [[Kurt Gödel]], Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm and [[Alvin Plantinga]] have all presented much-discussed ontological arguments which bear interesting connections to the earlier arguments of St. Anselm, [[Rene Descartes|Descartes]] and [[Gottfried Leibniz|Leibniz]]. Of these, the most interesting are those of Gödel and Plantinga; in these cases, however, it is unclear whether we should really say that these authors claim that the arguments are proofs of the existence of God.<ref>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/</ref>}}
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=== Plantinga's ontological argument ===
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The philosopher Ed Feser offers the following summary of Plantinga's ontological argument:
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{{Cquote|We might summarize his version (presented in The Nature of Necessity and elsewhere) as follows:
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1. There is a possible world W in which there exists a being with maximal greatness.
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2. Maximal greatness entails having maximal excellence in every possible world.
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3. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every possible world.
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4. So in W there exists a being which is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect in every possible world.
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5. So in W the proposition “There is no omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being” is impossible.
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6. But what is impossible in one possible world is impossible in every possible world.
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7. So the proposition “There is no omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being” is impossible in the actual world.
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8. So there is in the actual world an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being.<ref>[https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/12/plantingas-ontological-argument.html Plantinga's ontological argument]</ref>}}
    
== Criticism ==
 
== Criticism ==
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