Changes

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the [[White House]], the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the [[White House]], the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision. General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowldege of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.

 

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, also using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, also using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

   

   

Senator McCarthy furnished the [[Tydings Committee]] the real names attached to his numbered cases, and the Tydings Committee received the real names attached to the Lee list as well.  <ref>McCarthy to Tydings, 18 March 1950 with attached list.</ref>  Over the years that followed all of the names became public one way or another. Additionally, in a series of speeches McCarthy named others as secret Communists, spies, security risks, or participants in the Communist conspiracy.  General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowldege of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.

Senator McCarthy furnished the [[Tydings Committee]] the real names attached to his numbered cases, and the Tydings Committee received the real names attached to the Lee list as well.  <ref>McCarthy to Tydings, 18 March 1950 with attached list.</ref>  Over the years that followed all of the names became public one way or another. Additionally, in a series of speeches McCarthy named others as secret Communists, spies, security risks, or participants in the Communist conspiracy.

==Tensions of the times==

==Tensions of the times==