Changes

===Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson: 1953-1968===

===Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson: 1953-1968===

President [[John F. Kennedy]] called for youth, dynamism, vigor and an intellectual approach to aggressive new policies in foreign affairs.  The downside was his inexperience in foreign affairs, standing in stark contrast to the vast experience of the president he replaced, Republican [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]. Kennedy's rashness and inexperience caused a national humiliation in 1961 as he sent CIA-trained Cuban exiles into an ill-prepared attack on Castro's Cuba. At the [[Bay of Pigs]], all Kennedy's invaders were killed or captured, and he was forced to ransom them for cash.  Kennedy's supporters blamed the fiasco on Eisenhower.  Russian boss [[Nikita Khrushchev]], seeing for himself Kennedy's inexperience at a summit conference, threw up the [[Berlin Wall]] as the Soviets escalated the [[Cold War]] regarding the status of Berlin, predicting correctly that Kennedy's response would be weak.  Khrushchev went too far in 1962 when he sent nuclear missiles into Cuba aimed at the U.S.  For the first time since Washington and New Orleans were attacked in 1914–1815, the U.S. was vulnerable to a major attack by an enemy power. Kennedy and Khrushchev reached a compromise whereby the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba publicly (giving Kennedy a public relations triumph), while Kennedy secretly removed American missiles from Turkey aimed at the Soviets, and also promised that America would never invade Cuba—a promise still in effect in 2009.  Vietnam proved a trap for Kennedy as he sent in 16,000 military advisors to prop up an ineffective regime in South Vietnam. Historians are uncertain whether or how Kennedy would have avoided the failures of Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, for Kennedy himself had no definite plans of what to do.

President [[John F. Kennedy]] called for youth, dynamism, vigor and an intellectual approach to aggressive new policies in foreign affairs.  The downside was his inexperience in foreign affairs, standing in stark contrast to the vast experience of the president he replaced, Republican [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]. Kennedy's rashness and inexperience caused a national humiliation in 1961 as he sent CIA-trained Cuban exiles into an ill-prepared attack on Castro's Cuba. At the [[Bay of Pigs]], all Kennedy's invaders were killed or captured, and he was forced to ransom them for cash.  Kennedy's supporters blamed the fiasco on Eisenhower.  Russian boss [[Nikita Khrushchev]], seeing for himself Kennedy's inexperience at a summit conference, threw up the [[Berlin Wall]] as the Soviets escalated the [[Cold War]] regarding the status of Berlin, predicting correctly that Kennedy's response would be weak.  Khrushchev went too far in 1962 when he sent nuclear missiles into Cuba aimed at the U.S.  For the first time since Washington and New Orleans were attacked in 1914–1815, the U.S. was vulnerable to a major attack by an enemy power. Kennedy and Khrushchev reached a compromise whereby the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba publicly (giving Kennedy a public relations triumph), while Kennedy secretly removed American missiles from Turkey aimed at the Soviets, and also promised that America would never invade Cuba—a promise still in effect in 2009.  Vietnam proved a trap for Kennedy as he sent in 16,000 military advisors to prop up an ineffective regime in South Vietnam. Historians are uncertain whether or how Kennedy would have avoided the failures of Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, for Kennedy himself had no definite plans of what to do.

===Nixon and Kissinger: 1969-77===

===Nixon and Kissinger: 1969-77===

Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other. Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Nixon and Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). At the same time they successfully engineered a [[rapprochement]] with Communist [[China]], leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref>Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref> Aware that China and the Soviet Union were at sword's point, with rival claims to be the true Communists, Nixon and Kissinger used the "Soviet card" to win over Chinba by playing up the Soviet threat to the Chinese as a way of promoting closer relations with China. He even hinted at a US-China alliance to oppose the Soviets, and, with Nixon's trips to Moscow, hinted that China had better come to terms lest the US form an alliance with Moscow. The tactics worked, resulting in a friendly relationship with both Beijing and Moscow. As part of the détente, both powers reduced or ended their aid to North Vietnam, thus allowing a settlement of the [[Vietnam War]].<ref>Evelyn Goh, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(3): 475-502.</ref>  

[[Henry Kissinger]]'s first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other. Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, [[Richard Nixon]] and Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). At the same time they successfully engineered a [[rapprochement]] with Communist [[China]], leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref>Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref> Aware that China and the Soviet Union were at sword's point, with rival claims to be the true Communists, Nixon and Kissinger used the "Soviet card" to win over Chinba by playing up the Soviet threat to the Chinese as a way of promoting closer relations with China. He even hinted at a US-China alliance to oppose the Soviets, and, with Nixon's trips to Moscow, hinted that China had better come to terms lest the US form an alliance with Moscow. The tactics worked, resulting in a friendly relationship with both Beijing and Moscow. As part of the détente, both powers reduced or ended their aid to North Vietnam, thus allowing a settlement of the [[Vietnam War]].<ref>Evelyn Goh, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(3): 475-502.</ref>  

====Vietnam====

====Vietnam====