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| | The argument is dismissed by dropping one or more of the three starting givens: that God is omnipotent, that God is omnibenevolent, or that evil exists. | | The argument is dismissed by dropping one or more of the three starting givens: that God is omnipotent, that God is omnibenevolent, or that evil exists. |
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| − | If God is not all powerful, then his ability to constrain all evil in any given moment is limited, or, He may have set up parameters under which He will not intervene.
| + | REJECTING OMNIPOTENCE: |
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| − | If God is not all good, then that which is not good could exist. But then, who gives the ultimate framework of what is good? Because we find something to be unpleasant, does that mean it is evil? | + | If God is not all powerful, then his ability to constrain all evil in any given moment is limited. |
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| | + | REJECTING OMNIBENEVOLENCE: |
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| | + | If God is not all good, then evil may exist. |
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| | + | REJECTING THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL: |
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| | Perhaps evil does not exist - a view taken by [[Augustine]] who classified evil as a [[privation]]. Perhaps we call those things we do not like 'moral evils' without justification. But it strikes at the heart of our intuitions about what it means for something to be morally wrong if something like the torture of innocent children would not count. | | Perhaps evil does not exist - a view taken by [[Augustine]] who classified evil as a [[privation]]. Perhaps we call those things we do not like 'moral evils' without justification. But it strikes at the heart of our intuitions about what it means for something to be morally wrong if something like the torture of innocent children would not count. |
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| | + | 'TAPESTRY' VIEW: |
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| | There is also the question of whether an omnibenevolent God should want all evil to be stopped. If the allowance of evil makes possible some greater good, then the allowance of evil itself is not wrong. For instance if the exercise of free will means that evil can occur, is it better to create independent beings and allow free will or to not create at all? | | There is also the question of whether an omnibenevolent God should want all evil to be stopped. If the allowance of evil makes possible some greater good, then the allowance of evil itself is not wrong. For instance if the exercise of free will means that evil can occur, is it better to create independent beings and allow free will or to not create at all? |
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| | Also, there is the mathematical answer to evil. Given that the reward of the faithful is immeasurable bliss for eternity, then any amount of finite pain caused in a finite time period when taken over infinite bliss over infinite time makes the answer to pain zero. It is as if it never existed, and from a mathematical sense in an eternal picture, it never did. | | Also, there is the mathematical answer to evil. Given that the reward of the faithful is immeasurable bliss for eternity, then any amount of finite pain caused in a finite time period when taken over infinite bliss over infinite time makes the answer to pain zero. It is as if it never existed, and from a mathematical sense in an eternal picture, it never did. |
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| | == Free Will == | | == Free Will == |
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