| | [[File:Zhukov and Montgomery.PNG|left|200px|thumb|[[Marshall Georgi Zhukov]] and Montgomery in Occupied [[Berlin]], 1945.]] | | [[File:Zhukov and Montgomery.PNG|left|200px|thumb|[[Marshall Georgi Zhukov]] and Montgomery in Occupied [[Berlin]], 1945.]] |
| | Following the breakthrough in [[France]] in August 1944 an argument broke out between the Gen [[Dwight Eisenhower]], and the Commanding General of the 21st British Army Group, General Montgomery. Montgomery argued that a concentrated attack, which he would lead, on the northern line of advance was preferable to Eisenhower's two-pronged broad-front advance. When Eisenhower decided that as of 1 September 1944 he would assume command of the ground troops from Montgomery, the temporary ground forces commander, the debate widened to include command. Except for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Eisenhower did not take seriously Montgomery's single-thrust proposals.<ref>Chester Wilmot's ''Struggle for Europe'' (1952) told Montgomery's side of the story but focused the debate narrowly on [[strategy]], virtually excluding the arguments over command. Montgomery did not show Wilmot his papers concerning command, only strategy, so Wilmot wrote about what he knew. Politics influenced British [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]]'s history of the war, published in 1953, which omitted Churchill's reservations over Eisenhower's exercise of ground command, owing to the fact that Eisenhower was now the [[US President]]. See G. E. Patrick Murray, ''Eisenhower versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate'' (1996)</ref> | | Following the breakthrough in [[France]] in August 1944 an argument broke out between the Gen [[Dwight Eisenhower]], and the Commanding General of the 21st British Army Group, General Montgomery. Montgomery argued that a concentrated attack, which he would lead, on the northern line of advance was preferable to Eisenhower's two-pronged broad-front advance. When Eisenhower decided that as of 1 September 1944 he would assume command of the ground troops from Montgomery, the temporary ground forces commander, the debate widened to include command. Except for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Eisenhower did not take seriously Montgomery's single-thrust proposals.<ref>Chester Wilmot's ''Struggle for Europe'' (1952) told Montgomery's side of the story but focused the debate narrowly on [[strategy]], virtually excluding the arguments over command. Montgomery did not show Wilmot his papers concerning command, only strategy, so Wilmot wrote about what he knew. Politics influenced British [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]]'s history of the war, published in 1953, which omitted Churchill's reservations over Eisenhower's exercise of ground command, owing to the fact that Eisenhower was now the [[US President]]. See G. E. Patrick Murray, ''Eisenhower versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate'' (1996)</ref> |