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The 2017 exercises were part of a broader strategy to enhance the readiness and interoperability of Ukrainian forces with NATO and partner nations in response Russia’s support for the Donbas.
The 2017 exercises were part of a broader strategy to enhance the readiness and interoperability of Ukrainian forces with NATO and partner nations in response Russia’s support for the Donbas.
During [[President Trump]]'s first term not only did Trump supply [[Javelin]] anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, but the [[Pentagon]] approved anti-[[submarine]] warfare and amphibious warfare activities as part of the USEUCOM and NATO exercises. In addition, on September 4, 2020, U.S. Air Force [[B-52 Stratofortress]] bombers entered Ukrainian airspace for the first time, conducting a long flight along the borders of Crimea. From Russia’s perspective, Mr. Trump is neither an innocent nor a neutral party when it comes to negotiating an end to the war.
The 2018 exercises were part of Ukraine’s post-[[Maidan coup]] push for NATO compatibility following Russia's [[annexation of Crimea]] and the [[Donbas conflict]]. The U.S. and NATO emphasized “territorial defense” training, reflecting Ukraine’s need to counter [[hybrid warfare|hybrid threats]].
The 2018 exercises were part of Ukraine’s post-[[Maidan coup]] push for NATO compatibility following Russia's [[annexation of Crimea]] and the [[Donbas conflict]]. The U.S. and NATO emphasized “territorial defense” training, reflecting Ukraine’s need to counter [[hybrid warfare|hybrid threats]].