| | The cases the Government cites do not alter our conclusion. In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013), for example, the plaintiffs attempted to manufacture standing by voluntarily taking costly and burdensome measures that they said were necessary to protect the confidentiality of their communications in light of the Government surveillance policy they sought to challenge. Id., at 402, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264. Their problem, however, was that they could not show that they had been or were likely to be subjected to that policy in any event. Id., at 416, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264. Likewise, in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U. S. 660, 96 S. Ct. 2333, 49 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1976) (per curiam), we held that the unilateral decisions by a group of States to reimburse their residents for taxes levied by other States was not a basis to attack the legality of those taxes. Nothing in the challenged taxes required the plaintiff States to offer reimbursements; accordingly, the financial injury those States suffered was due to their own independent response to taxes levied on others. Id., at 664, 96 S. Ct. 2333, 49 L. Ed. 2d 124. Here, by contrast, the appellees’ injuries are directly inflicted by the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the provisions they now challenge. That appellees chose to subject themselves to those provisions does not change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. See 52 U. S. C. §30109(a)(5); 11 CFR §111.24. | | The cases the Government cites do not alter our conclusion. In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013), for example, the plaintiffs attempted to manufacture standing by voluntarily taking costly and burdensome measures that they said were necessary to protect the confidentiality of their communications in light of the Government surveillance policy they sought to challenge. Id., at 402, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264. Their problem, however, was that they could not show that they had been or were likely to be subjected to that policy in any event. Id., at 416, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264. Likewise, in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U. S. 660, 96 S. Ct. 2333, 49 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1976) (per curiam), we held that the unilateral decisions by a group of States to reimburse their residents for taxes levied by other States was not a basis to attack the legality of those taxes. Nothing in the challenged taxes required the plaintiff States to offer reimbursements; accordingly, the financial injury those States suffered was due to their own independent response to taxes levied on others. Id., at 664, 96 S. Ct. 2333, 49 L. Ed. 2d 124. Here, by contrast, the appellees’ injuries are directly inflicted by the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the provisions they now challenge. That appellees chose to subject themselves to those provisions does not change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. See 52 U. S. C. §30109(a)(5); 11 CFR §111.24. |
| − | One final point bears mentioning. The Government maintains that it should not be blamed for appellees’ injuries because it provided the Committee with a legally available “alternative” that would have avoided any liability—repaying Cruz’s loans in full with pre-election funds, within 20 days of the election. But even if such funds were available, the Government’s argument largely misses the point. For standing purposes, we accept as valid the merits of appellees’ legal claims, so we must assume that the loan repayment limitation —including the 20-day rule—unconstitutionally burdens speech. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975) (“standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff ’s contention that particular conduct is illegal”). Demanding that the Committee comply with the Government’s “alternative” would therefore require it to forgo the exercise of a First Amendment right we must assume it has—the right to repay its campaign debts in full, at any time. And this would require the Committee to subject itself to the very framework it says unconstitutionally burdens its speech. Such a principle finds no support in our standing jurisprudence. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158-159, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 189 L. Ed. 2d 246 (2014).}} | + | One final point bears mentioning. The Government maintains that it should not be blamed for appellees’ injuries because it provided the Committee with a legally available “alternative” that would have avoided any liability—repaying Cruz’s loans in full with pre-election funds, within 20 days of the election. But even if such funds were available, the Government’s argument largely misses the point. For standing purposes, we accept as valid the merits of appellees’ legal claims, so we must assume that the loan repayment limitation —including the 20-day rule—unconstitutionally burdens speech. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975) (“standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff ’s contention that particular conduct is illegal”). Demanding that the Committee comply with the Government’s “alternative” would therefore require it to forgo the exercise of a First Amendment right we must assume it has—the right to repay its campaign debts in full, at any time. And this would require the Committee to subject itself to the very framework it says unconstitutionally burdens its speech. Such a principle finds no support in our standing jurisprudence. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158-159, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 189 L. Ed. 2d 246 (2014). |