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, 21:36, July 9, 2025
'''Legislator standing''' refers to the legal standing by a legislator to challenge government action.
As of July 9, 2025, a total of 94 decisions (48 federal, 46 state) referred to "legislator standing." Some embraced it, while others rejected it.
== Ohio ==
{{cquote|Legislative standing stems from vote nullification when the executive branch will not enforce a duly enacted law by the legislature and, therefore, a legislator who voted for a bill could show an injury not suffered by the public in general. In ''State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly v. Brunner'', 114 Ohio St.3d 386, 2007 Ohio 3780, ¶ 17, 20, 872 N.E.2d 912, the Supreme Court of Ohio found standing for the Senate President and Speaker of the House, as legislators who voted with the majority to prevent their votes from being nullified. The court indicated that a legislator voting in the minority would not have standing. Id. at ¶ 19. This is the scope of legislator standing recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio.}}
''ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio'', 2012-Ohio-2655, ¶ 28, 973 N.E.2d 307, 316 (Ct. App.).
{{cquote|Instead, this matter is akin to Coleman, which has been interpreted as standing "for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified." Raines, 521 U.S. at 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849. In this case, the Senate president and the Speaker of the House voted for the bill at issue, there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and their votes would in effect be nullified by the governor's veto and the secretary of state's refusal to treat the bill as a validly enacted law. Therefore, we hold that the Senate president and the Speaker of the House, as legislators who voted for the bill, have the requisite standing to bring this mandamus action to prevent their votes from being nullified.
[**P21] This conclusion is consistent with State ex rel. Gilmore v. Brown (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 39, 6 OBR 59, 451 N.E.2d 235, in which we decided the merits of a mandamus claim by a sole state representative who had cosponsored a bill that had been passed by the General Assembly and vetoed by the governor. In Gilmore, the relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel the governor and the secretary of state to certify and record the bill. Gilmore alleged that the governor's attempted veto of the bill was invalid because the governor had not delivered it in compliance with Section 16, Article II of the Constitution. While we did not specifically address the issue of the relator's standing in Gilmore, our decision to reach the merits in that case is consistent with the approach to legislator-standing here.
[**P22] Because we conclude that the Senate president and Speaker of the House have standing to sue, as legislators who voted with the majority for Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, to prevent nullification of their individual votes, we need not, and therefore do not, consider their other proffered bases for standing. Additionally, because we conclude that relators Harris and Husted have standing, we do not reach the question whether the General Assembly has standing to sue in this case. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (2006), 547 U.S. 47, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 1303, 164 L.Ed.2d 156, 167, fn. 2 (noting that the presence of one party with standing was sufficient to satisfy standing requirements).}}
''State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly v. Brunner'', 2007-Ohio-3780, ¶¶ 20-22, 114 Ohio St. 3d 386, 391, 872 N.E.2d 912, 918-19
[[ctegory:standing]]