| | McMaster and his staff in field tried to teach soldiers to distinguish between [[nationalist]]-minded [[Sunni]]s and [[Salafi]] extremists, a distinction that, in the war's first two years, American soldiers were rarely able to make; they were simply trained to fight "bad guys." | | McMaster and his staff in field tried to teach soldiers to distinguish between [[nationalist]]-minded [[Sunni]]s and [[Salafi]] extremists, a distinction that, in the war's first two years, American soldiers were rarely able to make; they were simply trained to fight "bad guys." |
| − | The strategy focused on building an Iraqi [[nationalist]] identity of Muslims against ''takfiri'', or Muslims who shed their Islamic identity. This Muslim unity call of Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Sunni, and Shia, was intended to counter the Sunni-Shia divisions which spurred genocidal atrocities.<ref>http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar</ref> This [[globalist]] approach to using Iraqi [[nationalism]] to strengthen Muslim unity, however, is not without critics. | + | The strategy focused on building an Iraqi [[nationalist]] identity of Muslims against ''[[takfir]]i'', or Muslims who shed their Islamic identity. This Muslim unity call of Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Sunni, and Shia, was intended to counter the Sunni-Shia divisions which spurred genocidal atrocities.<ref>http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar</ref> This [[globalist]] approach to using Iraqi [[nationalism]] to strengthen Muslim unity, however, is not without critics. |