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→Notes: saw his regime as distinctly Muslim and commemorated the jihad of 'mad mullah' Abdullah Hasan, building a grand statue of him in Mogadishu!
The Isaaq people endured a horrific period of systematic violence and extermination at the hands of the Somalia government. This relentless campaign of persecution resulted in the loss of over half a million innocent lives, leaving countless Isaaq families shattered and forever scarred by the atrocities they witnessed.
The Isaaq people endured a horrific period of systematic violence and extermination at the hands of the Somalia government. This relentless campaign of persecution resulted in the loss of over half a million innocent lives, leaving countless Isaaq families shattered and forever scarred by the atrocities they witnessed.
[https://isaaqgenocide.info/about/]
[https://isaaqgenocide.info/about/]
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Motadel, David, 'Islamic Revolutionaries and the End of Empire', in Martin Thomas, and Andrew S. Thompson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 10 Aug. 2017), [https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198713197.013.32]
The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire. Kiribati: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp.569-570.
[https://books.google.com/books?id=pwN6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA569]
Another attempt was made by Saudi Arabia with the creation of the Muslim World League in 1962 and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969.
The founding meeting of the Muslim World League in Mecca brought together the international Salafi jet-set, from Said Ramadan to Abu al-Ma Mawdudi.
Riyadh's policies to forge this global Islamic alliance aimed to counter the perceived threat of Arab nationalism, socialism, and secularism. As the Cold War spread across the Islamic world, Washington and its European allies began to sponsor these efforts, perceiving Islamic political groups as bulwarks against non-aligning secularist regimes, and the Muslim countries from the Maghrib to Southeast Asia as a geopolitical belt against the Soviet Union.
Under pressure from the pious parts of their populations, from the late 1960s the ruling elites of many post-colonial regimes drew more heavily on Islam to strengthen their authority. This was most apparent in states that had, from the outset, embraced Islam to mobilize support, such as Pakistan, where in the early 1970s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto turned more and more to Islam to appease his Islamic opponents, a trend that intensified under Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who ruthlessly Islamized the country.
But even post-colonial regimes that had long resisted the demands of their Islamic opposition turned to religion. The most prominent example was Egypt's Anwar Sadat, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood himself, who in the 1970s took the title 'Believer President' (al-ra'is al-mu'min), employed religious rhetoric and symbols, proudly carrying his prayer bump (zabiba), built new mosques, and legalized the Muslim Brotherhood.
By the early 1970s, many other former Nasserists had followed, among them Sudan's Jafar Nimayri, who increasingly sided with the country's Islamic movements, including the neo-Mandiyyah, Algeria's Houari Boumediene, who showed greater interest in Islam than Ben Bella, and Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi, who periodically fashioned himself as a defender of Islam.
Somalia's Siad Barre, too, saw his regime as distinctly Muslim and commemorated the jihad of 'mad mullah' Abdullah Hasan, building a grand statue of him in Mogadishu!"
Even Bathist autocrat [[Saddam Hussein]] would eventually begin portraying himself as a devout Muslim, claiming to be a descendant of the Pro_phet, inscribing the words Allahu Akbar' on the Iraqi flag, and bizarrely putting on display in Baghdad's newly built Umm al-Ma'arik Mosque a 605-page Qur'an allegedly written with his own blood.
Perhaps not surprisingly, these transformations appeared to many as insincere, and could not appease the Islamic opposition determined to replace their regimes with an Islamic state. As it became increasingly obvious that the post-colonial rulers were unable to solve their countries' social and political problems, old slogans of Westernization, development, and modernization lost their appeal and Islamic opposition movements, with their visions of social justice and theocratic statehood, grew stronger.' Many took inspiration from Khomeini's victory in the [[Iran]]ian Revolution of 1978-1979.
In 1979, the Afghan mujahidin began their jihad against the socialist regime in Kabul and its Soviet protectors. The same year, Wahhabi militants seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca, demanding that the house of Saud abdicate.
In 1981, Islamists assassinated Sadat at a parade in Cairo. Across the Muslim world, the old ruling elites were challenged by a new wave of Islamic opposition groups, among them Sudan's National Islamic Front (1976), Nigeria's Izala (Removal) Society (1978), Indonesia's new Dar al-Islam offshoots (197os), Tunisia's Islamic Tendency Movement (1981), Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (1989), and Lebanon's Shia Amal (Hope) Movement (1974) and its rival and eventual successor Hizb Allah (Party of Allah; also Hezbollah) (1985). The rise of these move-ments went along with internal turmoil and civil war, from the Syrian Hama Uprising (1982) to the Algerian Civil War (1991-2002). In many ways, this wave of Islamic unrest marked the beginning of the end of the traditional post-colonial state in the Muslim world. To see it as an era of Islamic resurgence would, however, be too simplistic. The victories of Islamic movements since the 1970s are only an episode in the long history of their struggle against the colonial and post-colonial order. The 197os saw no revival of political Islam; what they did see, though, was a revival in Western scholarly interest in political Islam.
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