Changes

Kissinger's approach to foreign policy was shaped by his vision of world peace achieved through a global balance of power; and accordingly Kissinger believed that effective U.S. diplomacy needed to be backed by force and guided by the pragmatism of Realpolitik rather than by high ideals and abstract causes. In practice his diplomacy, which mixed a highly visible, personal style with secret, behind-the-scenes maneuverings, was marked by bold, often controversial, initiatives and by frequent travel between world capitals in what came to be known as "shuttle diplomacy".

Kissinger's approach to foreign policy was shaped by his vision of world peace achieved through a global balance of power; and accordingly Kissinger believed that effective U.S. diplomacy needed to be backed by force and guided by the pragmatism of Realpolitik rather than by high ideals and abstract causes. In practice his diplomacy, which mixed a highly visible, personal style with secret, behind-the-scenes maneuverings, was marked by bold, often controversial, initiatives and by frequent travel between world capitals in what came to be known as "shuttle diplomacy".

===Nuclear strategy===

===Nuclear strategy===

On taling office Nixon and Kissinger were briefed on the US nuclear war plan, the [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the John Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.<ref>William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(3): 34-78. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]; Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," ''Journal of Strategic Studies,'' Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 37-71; Scott Sagan, ''Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security'' (1989).</ref>

On taling office Nixon and Kissinger were briefed on the US nuclear war plan, the [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear [[escalation]] or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the John Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.<ref>William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(3): 34-78. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]; Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," ''Journal of Strategic Studies,'' Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 37-71; Scott Sagan, ''Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security'' (1989).</ref>

 

===Détente with Soviet Union and China===

===Détente with Soviet Union and China===

Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other . Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first [[Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]] (SALT I). At the same time Kissinger successfully engineered a [[rapprochement]] with Communist China, leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref>Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref>  

Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other . Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first [[Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]] (SALT I). At the same time Kissinger successfully engineered a [[rapprochement]] with Communist China, leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref>Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref>