Changes

NATO expansion since the Clinton era represents a betrayal of the international agreements that ended the Cold War, caused the [[Fall of the Wall]], and collapse of Soviet communism.  Western [[oligarch]]s and [[neo-fascist]] [[globalism|global]] interests have profited immeasurably  from ending the Cold War and betraying security agreements made with the Russian Federation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

NATO expansion since the Clinton era represents a betrayal of the international agreements that ended the Cold War, caused the [[Fall of the Wall]], and collapse of Soviet communism.  Western [[oligarch]]s and [[neo-fascist]] [[globalism|global]] interests have profited immeasurably  from ending the Cold War and betraying security agreements made with the Russian Federation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

 

To assent to the reunification of Germany, Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] ultimately agreed to a proposal from then U.S. Secretary of State [[James Baker (DOS)]] that a reunited Germany would be part of NATO but the military alliance would not move “one inch” to the east, that is, absorb any of the former [[Warsaw Pact]] nations into NATO.<ref>[https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F03c2978a-e903-461c-943e-8124481200b2_772x590.jpeg] Unclassified doc</ref><ref>[https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_600,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fpbs.substack.com%2Fmedia%2FFs9pHl7XoAUzGW5.jpg] Unclassified doc</ref>

To assent to the reunification of Germany, Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] ultimately agreed to a proposal from then U.S. Secretary of State [[James Baker (DOS)]] that a reunited Germany would be part of NATO but the military alliance would not move “one inch” to the east, that is, absorb any of the former [[Warsaw Pact]] nations into NATO.<ref>[https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F03c2978a-e903-461c-943e-8124481200b2_772x590.jpeg] Unclassified doc</ref><ref>[https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_600,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fpbs.substack.com%2Fmedia%2FFs9pHl7XoAUzGW5.jpg] Unclassified doc</ref>

On Feb. 9, 1990, Baker said: “We consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should give a guarantee that the reunification of Germany will not lead to the enlargement of NATO’s military organization to the East.” On the next day, then German Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] said: “We consider that NATO should not enlarge its sphere of activity.”<ref>https://consortiumnews.com/2022/01/28/the-tangled-tale-of-nato-expansion-at-the-heart-of-ukraine-crisis/</ref>  Gorbachev's mistake was not to get it in writing as a legally-binding agreement.<ref>For years it was believed there was no written record of the Baker-Gorbachev exchange at all, until the National Security Archive at George Washington University in December 2017 published a series of memos and cables about these assurances against NATO expansion eastward.</ref>

On Feb. 9, 1990, Baker said: “We consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should give a guarantee that the reunification of Germany will not lead to the enlargement of NATO’s military organization to the East.” On the next day, then German Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] said: “We consider that NATO should not enlarge its sphere of activity.”<ref>https://consortiumnews.com/2022/01/28/the-tangled-tale-of-nato-expansion-at-the-heart-of-ukraine-crisis/</ref>  Gorbachev's mistake was not to get it in writing as a legally-binding agreement.<ref>For years it was believed there was no written record of the Baker-Gorbachev exchange at all, until the National Security Archive at George Washington University in December 2017 published a series of memos and cables about these assurances against NATO expansion eastward.</ref>

 

{{quotebox-float|“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous ‘not one inch eastward’ assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by [[Western]] leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents …

{{quotebox-float|“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous ‘not one inch eastward’ assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by [[Western]] leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents …