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| | In July 1942, north of Norway, an attack by the Luftwaffe sank two ships, and convoy PQ-17, sailing from Iceland to Archangel, Russia, was ordered to scatter by the British Admiralty. It mistakenly thought the German battleship ''Tirpitz'' was about to intercept the convoy. Twenty-two more ships were sunk by the well-coordinated attack of German air forces.<ref>Harold J. McCormick, "Convoy Catastrophe: the Destruction of PQ-17 to North Russia in July, 1942." ''Sea History'' 1992 (62): 14-16. Issn: 0146-9312</ref> | | In July 1942, north of Norway, an attack by the Luftwaffe sank two ships, and convoy PQ-17, sailing from Iceland to Archangel, Russia, was ordered to scatter by the British Admiralty. It mistakenly thought the German battleship ''Tirpitz'' was about to intercept the convoy. Twenty-two more ships were sunk by the well-coordinated attack of German air forces.<ref>Harold J. McCormick, "Convoy Catastrophe: the Destruction of PQ-17 to North Russia in July, 1942." ''Sea History'' 1992 (62): 14-16. Issn: 0146-9312</ref> |
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| − | After 1942 the Soviets completely restructured their air force around mobile air armies. By 1942-3 Soviet air power challenged the Luftwaffe for air supremacy in the Stalingrad, Kuban, and Kursk campaigns. Frontal aviation's 17 air armies were complemented by a long-range air army in 1944, by which time the Soviets had air superiority, though it lacked long range bombers. As a result, the Soviets had more planes and more gasoline. The Russian front became a meatgrinder for the Luftwaffe; it was systematically worn down. | + | After 1942 the Soviets completely restructured their air force around mobile air armies. By 1942-3 Soviet air power challenged the Luftwaffe for air supremacy in the Stalingrad, Kuban, and Kursk campaigns. Frontal aviation's 17 air armies were complemented by a long-range air army in 1944, by which time the Soviets had air superiority, though it lacked long range bombers. As a result, the Soviets had more planes and more gasoline. The Russian front became a [[meatgrinder]] for the Luftwaffe; it was systematically worn down. |
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| | ===Failure of Cooperation=== | | ===Failure of Cooperation=== |
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| | Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> | | Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> |
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| − | In sharp contrast to the smooth cooperation of the Allies, the Luftwaffe ignored opportunities for strategic and economic cooperation with the air forces of its allies Italy, Finland, Romania, and Hungary. Instead of using factories in France, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia to build new air fleets, it removed the machinery and shut the factories.<ref>James S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War Ii: Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation." ''Air Power History'' 2004 51(2): 4-19. Issn: 1044-016x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> | + | In sharp contrast to the smooth cooperation of the Allies, the Luftwaffe ignored opportunities for strategic and economic cooperation with the air forces of its allies Italy, Finland, Romania, and Hungary. Instead of using factories in France, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia to build new air fleets, it removed the machinery and shut the factories.<ref>James S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War Ii: Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation." ''Air Power History'' 2004 51(2): 4-19. Issn: 1044-016x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> |
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| | ==Collapse== | | ==Collapse== |