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| | [[File:Hezbollah-Support-Clans.jpg|thumb|Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime]] | | [[File:Hezbollah-Support-Clans.jpg|thumb|Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime]] |
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| − | "Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime." Explained: <ref>Joseph M. Humire, [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-maduro-hezbollah-nexus-how-iran-backed-networks-prop-up-the-venezuelan-regime/ The Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime]. '"Atlantic Council'', Oct 7, 2020.</ref> | + | "Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime." Explained:<ref>Joseph M. Humire, [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-maduro-hezbollah-nexus-how-iran-backed-networks-prop-up-the-venezuelan-regime/ The Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime]. '"Atlantic Council'', Oct 7, 2020.</ref> |
| | Key Points: | | Key Points: |
| | <blockquote> | | <blockquote> |
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| | * The United States, allies, and international institutions must ramp up regional counterterrorism collaboration, crack down on illicit financial networks, and build stronger ties with Lebanese and other Arab communities in Latin America. | | * The United States, allies, and international institutions must ramp up regional counterterrorism collaboration, crack down on illicit financial networks, and build stronger ties with Lebanese and other Arab communities in Latin America. |
| | </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
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| | + | From an Oct 2025 testimony: Global Gangsters: Hezbollah’s Latin American Drug Trafficking Operations.<ref>"[https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/global-gangsters-hezbollahs-latin-american-drug-trafficking-operations-marshall-billingslea Global Gangsters: Hezbollah’s Latin American Drug Trafficking Operations]." By Marshall Billingslea, ''Hudson Institute'', Oct 21, 2025</ref> |
| | + | Marshall Billingslea testified before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in October 2025, shedding light on Hezbollah’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations in Latin America, which fund its terrorist activities. |
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| | + | Key Points from Billingslea’s Testimony: |
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| | + | 1. Hezbollah's Presence in Latin America: |
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| | + | * Hezbollah has been active in Latin America since the 1990s, starting with terrorist attacks in Argentina, such as the bombings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the AMIA Jewish Community Center (1994). |
| | + | * Its "Unit 910" (External Security Organization) has expanded its infrastructure across the region, initially in Colombia and Paraguay, particularly in areas with weak governance and corruption. |
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| | + | 2. <u>Initial Business Ventures</u>: |
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| | + | * Hezbollah established businesses, such as retail stores and trade-based money laundering operations in cities like Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and Sao Paulo (Brazil), benefiting from lax enforcement on the border. |
| | + | * Over time, it became involved in narcotics trafficking, starting with the smuggling of cocaine in charcoal, which was used to evade detection. |
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| | + | 3. <u>Drug Trade Expansion</u>: |
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| | + | * By the mid-2000s, Hezbollah began forming alliances with Latin American drug cartels, especially in Colombia. The group trafficked cocaine through Venezuela and Syria, facilitating weapons exchanges with groups like the FARC. |
| | + | * In 2015, authorities became more concerned about the scale of cocaine trafficking, particularly via Hezbollah-linked operations in Colombia. |
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| | + | 4. <u>Financial Impact</u>: |
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| | + | * By 2018, it was estimated that as much as 30% of Hezbollah’s funds, around $200 million a year, came from Latin America. This revenue was crucial to the group’s operations, especially as financial support from Iran became more uncertain. |
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| | + | 5. <u>Venezuela as a Hub</u>: |
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| | + | * Under the leadership of Hugo Chavez and later Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela became a critical base for Hezbollah, providing not only a safe haven but also logistical support for its operations. Hezbollah used Venezuelan passports and documents to facilitate operatives’ movements and identity concealment. |
| | + | * Venezuela's regime cooperated with Hezbollah, awarding contracts to Hezbollah-controlled businesses and aiding in the distribution of false identification documents. |
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| | + | 6. <u>Recent Developments (Oct 2025)</u>: |
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| | + | * Recent reports indicate that Hezbollah has increasingly relied on Venezuela as a safe haven, with 400 Hezbollah commanders reportedly ordered to relocate to Latin America, fearing targeting by Lebanese authorities. |
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| | + | <u>Conclusion</u>: |
| | + | Billingslea stressed that Hezbollah’s expansion into the Latin American drug trade was a direct result of the group’s diminishing infrastructure in Lebanon and the increasing pressure on Iran. The Venezuelan regime has become a key player not only in facilitating Hezbollah’s drug operations but also in providing a refuge for its operatives. Moving forward, Billingslea warned that Hezbollah is likely to continue its reliance on Latin America to fund its terrorism, particularly through the drug trade. |
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| | + | This testimony emphasizes the growing importance of Latin America, particularly Venezuela, in Hezbollah's international operations and its funding mechanisms through drug trafficking. |
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| | Hezbollah-Venezuela (Chavez/Maduro) Connection.<ref>[https://www.jfeed.com/news-israel/hezbollah-venezuela-connection The Hezbollah-Venezuela Connection: What You Don't Know]. ''JFeed'', Jan 6, 2025.<br> | | Hezbollah-Venezuela (Chavez/Maduro) Connection.<ref>[https://www.jfeed.com/news-israel/hezbollah-venezuela-connection The Hezbollah-Venezuela Connection: What You Don't Know]. ''JFeed'', Jan 6, 2025.<br> |