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| | Pershing's main qualification was his command presence. Ramrod straight, dedicated totally to the Army Way, he looked and talked like a man in command. He was at ease in dealing with senior Allied officials, and with civilian experts. Time and again he stood up to the field marshals and prime ministers, insisting that his Americans would be an independent battle force, and would not be used as piecemeal reinforcements for Allied units.<ref>Pershing, ''My Experiences,'' 2:29, 32, 35</ref> | | Pershing's main qualification was his command presence. Ramrod straight, dedicated totally to the Army Way, he looked and talked like a man in command. He was at ease in dealing with senior Allied officials, and with civilian experts. Time and again he stood up to the field marshals and prime ministers, insisting that his Americans would be an independent battle force, and would not be used as piecemeal reinforcements for Allied units.<ref>Pershing, ''My Experiences,'' 2:29, 32, 35</ref> |
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| − | Pershing's first year was consumed in planning and logistics, especially the establishment of training camps, supply dumps, and communications systems inside France. His overarching challenge in the first half of 1918 was how to get enough shipping to send millions of men and their arms "Over There" to France. While he had scant interest in large-scale military strategy or tactics, Pershing did show superb organizational skills, and built a brilliant staff dedicated to efficiency. Indeed, the AEF staff was more impressive and effective than the General Staff back in Washington.<ref>By contrast, In World War II, Marshall's staff in Washington was superb, as were the staffs of Eisenhower (headed by Walter Bedell Smith) in London and MacArthur in Australia.</ref> | + | Pershing's first year was consumed in planning and logistics, especially the establishment of training camps, supply dumps, and communications systems inside France. His overarching challenge in the first half of 1918 was how to get enough shipping to send millions of men and their arms "Over There" to France. While he had scant interest in large-scale military strategy or tactics, Pershing did show superb organizational skills, and built a brilliant staff dedicated to efficiency. Indeed, the AEF staff was more impressive and effective than the General Staff back in Washington.<ref>By contrast, In World War II, Marshall's staff in Washington was superb, as were the staffs of Eisenhower (headed by [[Walter Bedell Smith]]) in London and MacArthur in Australia.</ref> |
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| | + | Senior officers like [[James Harbord]] and [[Peyton March]] (chief of artillery) were models of American efficiency, as were mid-level staff officers like colonels Fox Conner and [[George Marshall]]. By contrast with the AEF staff, the General Staff back in Washington had entered the war with fewer than 20 officers (compared to 650 officers in the German General Staff in 1914, or 232 on the British), and the Chief of Staff, Hugh Scott, and his deputy and replacement [[Tasker Bliss]] were bogged down in minutia. They did not have the President's ear and they lacked control over the key bureaus like Ordnance (weapon procurement) and the Quartermaster Corps (supplies). Divided command led to deepening administrative chaos until General March was brought back from France in March, 1918, becoming Chief of Staff with a free hand over all Army activities in the States, while Pershing remained supreme in Europe.<ref>Coffman, ''The War to End All Wars,'' pp. 23, 51-2</ref> |
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| − | Senior officers like [[James Harbord]] and [[Peyton March]] (chief of artillery) were models of American efficiency, as were mid-level staff officers like colonels Fox Conner and [[George Marshall]]. By contrast with the AEF staff, the General Staff back in Washington had entered the war with fewer than 20 officers (compared to 650 officers in the German General Staff in 1914, or 232 on the British), and the Chief of Staff, Hugh Scott, and his deputy and replacement [[Tasker Bliss]] were bogged down in minutia. They did not have the President's ear and they lacked control over the key bureaus like Ordnance (weapon procurement) and the Quartermaster Corps (supplies). Divided command led to deepening administrative chaos until General March was brought back from France in March, 1918, becoming Chief of Staff with a free hand over all Army activities in the States, while Pershing remained supreme in Europe.<ref>Coffman, ''The War to End All Wars,'' pp. 23, 51-2</ref>
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| | ===War plans=== | | ===War plans=== |
| | France and Britain, running short of manpower, hoped to use American regiments as replacements for their depleted divisions. Pershing gave them several all-black regiments to be used that way, but otherwise insisted that the AEF would be an independent combat force, under his command, and would not be absorbed into French or British units. He planned for an AEF of 3 million men, including about 500,000 in combat units and the rest in supply and support roles. He demanded and got control of a separate geographical sector on the Western Front—the southern third. | | France and Britain, running short of manpower, hoped to use American regiments as replacements for their depleted divisions. Pershing gave them several all-black regiments to be used that way, but otherwise insisted that the AEF would be an independent combat force, under his command, and would not be absorbed into French or British units. He planned for an AEF of 3 million men, including about 500,000 in combat units and the rest in supply and support roles. He demanded and got control of a separate geographical sector on the Western Front—the southern third. |