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As part of Iran's ongoing policy O
 
As part of Iran's ongoing policy O
 
of deploying its Afghan Shi'ite Militia across the Middle East, [[IRGC]] is reportedly training Fatemiyoun Brigade<ref>[https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-fatemiyoun-army-irans-afghan-crusaders-in-syria/ The Fatemiyoun Army: Iran's Afghan Crusaders in Syria], ''thediplomat.com'', Apr 23, 2021.</ref><ref>[https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/ What Is the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Why Does It Make the Taliban Nervous?], ''PBS'', Jul 20, 2021</ref> in drone use in Syria.<ref>[https://www.memri.org/reports/part-irans-ongoing-policy-deploying-its-afghan-shiite-militia-across-middle-east-irgc As Part Of Iran's Ongoing Policy Of Deploying Its Afghan Shi'ite Militia Across Middle East, IRGC Reportedly Training Fatemiyoun Brigade In Drone Use In Syria], ''Memri'', Sep 22, 2022.</ref>
 
of deploying its Afghan Shi'ite Militia across the Middle East, [[IRGC]] is reportedly training Fatemiyoun Brigade<ref>[https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-fatemiyoun-army-irans-afghan-crusaders-in-syria/ The Fatemiyoun Army: Iran's Afghan Crusaders in Syria], ''thediplomat.com'', Apr 23, 2021.</ref><ref>[https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/ What Is the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Why Does It Make the Taliban Nervous?], ''PBS'', Jul 20, 2021</ref> in drone use in Syria.<ref>[https://www.memri.org/reports/part-irans-ongoing-policy-deploying-its-afghan-shiite-militia-across-middle-east-irgc As Part Of Iran's Ongoing Policy Of Deploying Its Afghan Shi'ite Militia Across Middle East, IRGC Reportedly Training Fatemiyoun Brigade In Drone Use In Syria], ''Memri'', Sep 22, 2022.</ref>
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===Tensions===
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In military terms, Iran is a "near peer" adversary for the [[United States]], weaker but on home turf. Position matters. Making the enemy come to you confers "operational advantage".
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While Iran’s operational [[missile]]s cannot reach the [[US]] homeland, their ranges cover much of the [[Middle East]], including US military bases in the [[Gulf Cooperation Council]] (GCC) states, naval forces in the [[Persian Gulf]] and [[Gulf of Oman]], and allied capitals such as [[Jerusalem]] and [[Amman]].
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The mix of [[ballistic missile]]s and [[cruise missile]]s with solid-fuel propulsion, which allows quicker launch and repositioning, presents a multi-domain threat across land, sea, and potentially [[air defense]] networks.
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Ballistic missiles such as the Shahab-3 and Sejjil could threaten bases in [[Qatar]], [[Kuwait]], and the [[UAE]] within minutes, while cruise missiles like Ya-Ali and Soumar could complicate defense systems by exploiting low-altitude flight paths and radar blind spots.
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Anti-ship cruise missiles such as Ra'ad and more distant range cruise systems could endanger US [[aircraft carrier]] strike groups and amphibious forces, especially in chokepoints like the [[Strait of Hormuz]] where Iran's [[geography]] gives it [[strategic]] advantage.
    
==Disputed Territories==
 
==Disputed Territories==
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