Changes

The Germans began losing one thousand planes a month on the western front (and another 400 on the [[Eastern Front]]). Realizing that the best way to defeat the Luftwaffe was not to stick close to the bombers but to aggressively seek out the enemy, Doolittle told his Mustangs to "go hunting for Jerries. Flush them out in the air and beat them up on the ground on the way home." On one occasion German air controllers identified a large force of approaching B-17s, and sent all the Luftwaffe's 750 fighters to attack. Error. The bogeys were all Mustangs, which shot down 98 interceptors while losing 11. The actual B-17s were elsewhere, and completed their mission without a loss. In February, 1944, the Luftwaffe lost 33% of its front line fighters and 18% of its pilots; the next month it lost 56% of its fighters and 22% of the pilots. April was just as bad, 43% and 20%, and May was worst of all, at 50% and 25%. German factories continued to produce many new planes, and inexperienced pilots did report for duty; but their life expectancy was down to a couple of combat sorties. Increasingly the Luftwaffe went into hiding; with losses down to 1% per mission, the American bombers now got through and Luftwaffe tactical air power had vanished.<ref>Craven and Cate 3:664</ref>  

The Germans began losing one thousand planes a month on the western front (and another 400 on the [[Eastern Front]]). Realizing that the best way to defeat the Luftwaffe was not to stick close to the bombers but to aggressively seek out the enemy, Doolittle told his Mustangs to "go hunting for Jerries. Flush them out in the air and beat them up on the ground on the way home." On one occasion German air controllers identified a large force of approaching B-17s, and sent all the Luftwaffe's 750 fighters to attack. Error. The bogeys were all Mustangs, which shot down 98 interceptors while losing 11. The actual B-17s were elsewhere, and completed their mission without a loss. In February, 1944, the Luftwaffe lost 33% of its front line fighters and 18% of its pilots; the next month it lost 56% of its fighters and 22% of the pilots. April was just as bad, 43% and 20%, and May was worst of all, at 50% and 25%. German factories continued to produce many new planes, and inexperienced pilots did report for duty; but their life expectancy was down to a couple of combat sorties. Increasingly the Luftwaffe went into hiding; with losses down to 1% per mission, the American bombers now got through and Luftwaffe tactical air power had vanished.<ref>Craven and Cate 3:664</ref>  

In early 1943 the strategic bombers were directed against U-boat pens, which were easy to reach and which represented a major strategic threat to Allied logistics. However, the pens were very solidly built—it took 7,000 flying hours to destroy one sub there, about the same effort that it took to destroy one-third of Cologne. In "Operation Crossbow" about a fourth of the bombers were reassigned to attacks on Germany's V-1 and V-2 bases in 1944. The raids were ineffective.<ref>Adam L. Gruen, ''Preemptive Defense: Allied Air Power Versus Hitler's V-Weapons, 1943-1945'' (1998) [http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/preemptive_defense.pdf online edition]</ref> The antisubmarine and Crossbow campaigns thus were a "victory" for the Germans because they wasted Allied air power.

In early 1943 the strategic bombers were directed against U-boat pens, which were easy to reach and which represented a major strategic threat to Allied [[logistics]]. However, the pens were very solidly built—it took 7,000 flying hours to destroy one sub there, about the same effort that it took to destroy one-third of Cologne. In "Operation Crossbow" about a fourth of the bombers were reassigned to attacks on Germany's V-1 and V-2 bases in 1944. The raids were ineffective.<ref>Adam L. Gruen, ''Preemptive Defense: Allied Air Power Versus Hitler's V-Weapons, 1943-1945'' (1998) [http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/preemptive_defense.pdf online edition]</ref> The antisubmarine and Crossbow campaigns thus were a "victory" for the Germans because they wasted Allied air power.

From April through August, 1944, both the AAF's and the RAF's strategic bombers were placed under [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]'s direction, where they were used tactically to support the invasion. Airmen protested vigorously against this subordination of the air war to the land campaign, but Eisenhower forced the issue and used the bombers to simultaneously strangle Germany's supply system, burn out its oil refineries, and destroy its warplanes. Mission accomplished, Ike returned the bombers in September.<ref>Craven and Cate 3:47</ref>  The Flying Fortresses continued their mission of demolishing German's industrial plant and rail system until April 1945.

From April through August, 1944, both the AAF's and the RAF's strategic bombers were placed under [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]'s direction, where they were used tactically to support the invasion. Airmen protested vigorously against this subordination of the air war to the land campaign, but Eisenhower forced the issue and used the bombers to simultaneously strangle Germany's supply system, burn out its oil refineries, and destroy its warplanes. Mission accomplished, Ike returned the bombers in September.<ref>Craven and Cate 3:47</ref>  The Flying Fortresses continued their mission of demolishing German's industrial plant and rail system until April 1945.