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Sudrum (2001) argues the Union Navy's control of the American coastal and internal waterways was a decisive factor in the Civil War, but its exact role is often misunderstood. In order to assess that role, one must consider what would have happened had the South not only prevented or lifted the Union's blockade of southern ports, but mounted attacks against or blockaded northern ports.  Northern naval superiority had three crucial effects upon the war, according to Sudrum. First, the North's naval blockade prevented the South from exercising its price-setting power in the market for raw cotton. Although some have contended that the demand for southern-grown raw cotton was destined to decline in the 1860s, the evidence indicates that, in the absence of the blockade-induced shortage of raw cotton, the demand for southern-grown cotton would have continued to be robust and growing. Instead, the blockade constricted exports of raw cotton and suppressed revenue; actual southern revenue from raw cotton was reduced by up to $700,000,000 during the war. This revenue loss severely impaired the South's war-making ability, particularly its ability to acquire a first-class navy. Second, Federal control of the coastal waters and inland rivers impeded southern intra-regional movement of goods, cutting off needed supplies of beef and other foodstuffs from Texas and Florida to civilians and soldiers throughout the eastern Confederacy. Since the North's control of the American waters exerted such deleterious effects upon the southern economy, one should ask whether the North was vulnerable to attacks upon its economy. This leads to the third, and perhaps most important, effect: preventing the South from mounting naval actions against northern ports. Such attacks would have created economic hardships and eroded support for the Lincoln administration and the northern war effort. Given these effects of northern naval superiority, it is hard to see how the North could have defeated the South without its possession of a superior navy.  

Sudrum (2001) argues the Union Navy's control of the American coastal and internal waterways was a decisive factor in the Civil War, but its exact role is often misunderstood. In order to assess that role, one must consider what would have happened had the South not only prevented or lifted the Union's blockade of southern ports, but mounted attacks against or blockaded northern ports.  Northern naval superiority had three crucial effects upon the war, according to Sudrum. First, the North's naval blockade prevented the South from exercising its price-setting power in the market for raw cotton. Although some have contended that the demand for southern-grown raw cotton was destined to decline in the 1860s, the evidence indicates that, in the absence of the blockade-induced shortage of raw cotton, the demand for southern-grown cotton would have continued to be robust and growing. Instead, the blockade constricted exports of raw cotton and suppressed revenue; actual southern revenue from raw cotton was reduced by up to $700,000,000 during the war. This revenue loss severely impaired the South's war-making ability, particularly its ability to acquire a first-class navy. Second, Federal control of the coastal waters and inland rivers impeded southern intra-regional movement of goods, cutting off needed supplies of beef and other foodstuffs from Texas and Florida to civilians and soldiers throughout the eastern Confederacy. Since the North's control of the American waters exerted such deleterious effects upon the southern economy, one should ask whether the North was vulnerable to attacks upon its economy. This leads to the third, and perhaps most important, effect: preventing the South from mounting naval actions against northern ports. Such attacks would have created economic hardships and eroded support for the Lincoln administration and the northern war effort. Given these effects of northern naval superiority, it is hard to see how the North could have defeated the South without its possession of a superior navy.  

Some historians have argued, "The blockade,  because it did not deny the South essential imports, failed to have a major military effect."<ref>Archer Jones, "Military Means, Political Ends: Strategy," in Gabor S. Boritt, ed. ''Why the Confederacy Lost.'' (1992) p. 74</ref> That analysis ignores the inability of the Confederacy to clothe and feed its remaining soldiers, or to use its long coastline to move troops and supplies by boat.  Most economic analysis agrees the blockade crushed the Southern economy and decisively weakened the military's maneuverability and logistics. Surdam shows the blockade denied the Confederacy the badly needed purchasing power that exporting its cotton and tobacco would have generated, raised the costs and reduced the volume of imported goods, and hampered intraregional trade. Without these effects the North would have faced much greater difficulties in subduing the South.<ref>See Surdam (1998) and Surdam (2004) for elaborate detail.</ref> Elekung (2004) concludes, "The fall of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina, early in 1865 closed the last major port for blockade runners, and in quick succession Richmond was evacuated, the Army of Northern Virginia disintegrated, and General Lee surrendered. Thus, most economists give the Union blockade a prominent role in the outcome of the war."

Some historians have argued, "The blockade,  because it did not deny the South essential imports, failed to have a major military effect."<ref>Archer Jones, "Military Means, Political Ends: Strategy," in Gabor S. Boritt, ed. ''Why the Confederacy Lost.'' (1992) p. 74</ref> That analysis ignores the inability of the Confederacy to clothe and feed its remaining soldiers, or to use its long coastline to move troops and supplies by boat.  Most economic analysis agrees the blockade crushed the Southern economy and decisively weakened the military's maneuverability and [[logistics]]. Surdam shows the blockade denied the Confederacy the badly needed purchasing power that exporting its cotton and tobacco would have generated, raised the costs and reduced the volume of imported goods, and hampered intraregional trade. Without these effects the North would have faced much greater difficulties in subduing the South.<ref>See Surdam (1998) and Surdam (2004) for elaborate detail.</ref> Elekung (2004) concludes, "The fall of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina, early in 1865 closed the last major port for blockade runners, and in quick succession Richmond was evacuated, the Army of Northern Virginia disintegrated, and General Lee surrendered. Thus, most economists give the Union blockade a prominent role in the outcome of the war."

 

==See also==

==See also==

* [[American Civil War homefront]]

* [[American Civil War homefront]]