Changes

27. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to use against it and (or) its allies of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when under threat the very existence of the state. The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken President of the Russian Federation.<ref>https://thailand.mid.ru/en/o_rossii/vneshnyaya_politika/voennaya_doktrina_rf/</ref>

27. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to use against it and (or) its allies of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when under threat the very existence of the state. The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken President of the Russian Federation.<ref>https://thailand.mid.ru/en/o_rossii/vneshnyaya_politika/voennaya_doktrina_rf/</ref>

====Gerasimov Doctrine====

====The so-called 'Gerasimov Doctrine'====

The Gerasimov Doctrine, named for Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defence Gen. Valery Gerasimov, has long been held as a sort of apotheosis of Russia’s understanding of the evolution and philosophy of modern war-fighting.

The Gerasimov Doctrine, named for Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defence Gen. Valery Gerasimov, has long been held as a sort of apotheosis of Russia’s understanding of the evolution and philosophy of modern war-fighting.

"The doctrine calls for a 4:1 ratio of non-military to military action. Gerasimov emphasizes "the importance of controlling the information space and the real-time coordination of all aspects of a campaign, in addition to the use of targeted strikes deep in enemy territory and the destruction of critical civilian as well as military infrastructure." Also he proposes to cloak regular military units in "the disguise of peacekeeper or crisis-management forces."<ref>{{cite web |last=Murphy |first=Martin |date=12 September 2016 |title=Understanding Russia's Concept for Total War in Europe |url=https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/understanding-russias-concept-total-war-europe |website=The Heritage Foundation |language=en}}</ref>}}

"The doctrine calls for a 4:1 ratio of non-military to military action. Gerasimov emphasizes "the importance of controlling the information space and the real-time coordination of all aspects of a campaign, in addition to the use of targeted strikes deep in enemy territory and the destruction of critical civilian as well as military infrastructure." Also he proposes to cloak regular military units in "the disguise of peacekeeper or crisis-management forces."<ref>{{cite web |last=Murphy |first=Martin |date=12 September 2016 |title=Understanding Russia's Concept for Total War in Europe |url=https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/understanding-russias-concept-total-war-europe |website=The Heritage Foundation |language=en}}</ref>}}

Interestingly, the ‘Doctrine’ came about at a time (2013) when Russia was just preparing to engage in its first truly ‘[[hybrid war]]’ scenarios in both [[Syria]] and Ukraine. And thus it outlined sets of parameters for maximizing effectiveness in these asymmetric and ‘irregular’ style conflicts—how to best leverage small forces with a variety of clandestine actions, from cyberspace, political, partisan, indirect/irregular/paramilitary forces, asymmetric techniques, etc.

 

To understand this divergence, we must first dispel a persistent myth: the notion of "[[hybrid warfare]]" as a Russian doctrine. The term never existed in Russian military theory. It emerged from a [[The West|Western]] misreading of General Gerasimov's 2013 essay, later amplified by analysts who imagined Russia waging some novel form of conflict blending cyberattacks, [[disinformation]], and conventional force. By 2018, even Mark Galeotti, the prominent scholar who popularized the "Gerasimov Doctrine", publicly retracted the concept in [[Foreign Policy magazine]], admitting he had "created a chimera."

However, lesser known is the fact that in 2019 Gerasimov, was said to have updated a sort of informal v2.0 of his ‘Doctrine’, which once more re-emphasized the importance of preparing for a more classical, direct military confrontation of bruteforce armies.

However, lesser known is the fact that in 2019 Gerasimov, was said to have updated a sort of informal v2.0 of his ‘Doctrine’, which once more re-emphasized the importance of preparing for a more classical, direct military confrontation of bruteforce armies.