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→Belt and Road Initiative
==Belt and Road Initiative==
==Belt and Road Initiative==
The [[Belt and Road Initiative]] (BRI) began as an effort to extend [[China]]'s [[domestic]] industrial policies to countries beyond its borders. It was framed as a means of [[export]]ing surplus Chinese [[industrial]] capacity to build [[infrastructure]] that could connect all the countries of the [[Eurasia]]n "world island" and [[East Africa]] to China. But as other countries have sought to tap Chinese [[capital]] and [[construction]] expertise, the BRI has expanded to include partners states on every [[continent]], including [[Africa]] and the [[Western hemisphere|Americas]]. In Africa, BRI-related [[investment]] has become the largest source of funding for [[economic]] uplift, dwarfing [[financial]] support from institutions like the [[World Bank]]. China's domestic savings are being channeled into foreign investment in development, not just through the BRI, but through new institutions that are compatible with and complement the [[Bretton Woods]] framework.
The BRI finances [[investment]] in [[infrastructure]] to raise [[economic]] efficiency and bring into being a worldwide [[logistics]] network that is connected to China but available to others. It emphasizes [[market]] opening and includes the [[negotiation]] of [[free trade]] agreements and standardized arrangements to speed customs clearance, bonded storage, and the transit of goods. It imposes no requirement for Chinese partners to exclude relationships with other countries. So, it has little if anything in common with [[mercantilism]].
Nevertheless, linking other countries' economies to China undercuts their previous dependence on the [[United States]] and its allies. Even if the BRI continues to avoid efforts to exclude others from [[trade]] and [[investment]] in the countries that participate in it, it gives them an incremental stake in good relations with [[Beijing]] to balance their interest in cooperating with other [[great power]]s. This makes it likely to create a [[politico]]-[[economic]] circle of deference for China, if not dependence on it and an exclusionary sphere of influence.
Although the BRI is geoeconomic, rather than [[geopolitical]], in nature, and has no unified planning apparatus or oversight of the projects it fosters, it is viewed with alarm by the United States, which sees it as a threat to its previous global primacy and as a potential Chinese sphere of influence. So far, [[U.S.]] opposition to the BRI has taken the form of [[coercion| coercive]] [[diplomacy]] and hostile [[information]] campaigns. This approach has registered few if any successes because it misconstrues the geoeconomic nature of the BRI as geopolitical. Fiscal and other constraints make it difficult, if not impossible for the U.S. to offer attractive alternatives to cooperation by BRI member countries with China. Neither the United States nor its [[European]] allies now have the financial or [[engineering]] capacity to compete effectively with Chinese policy banks or construction companies. The old adage, 'you can't beat something with nothing' applies.
==See also==
==See also==