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→Middle East
As the 21st century proceeded, U.S dominance of the affairs of the "[[Middle East]]" eroded. Iran has created a politico-military sphere of influence in the [[Fertile Crescent]] (Iraq, Lebanon, [[Palestine]], Syria) and [[Yemen]] at the expense of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Despite the resurgence in Russian influence and intermittent [[French]] attempts to reassert a leading role in [[Lebanon]], regional rather than external powers began to drive politico-military rivalries and dynamics there. China is displacing other [[great power]]s as the region's largest economic partner, but the Middle East is no longer in the sphere of influence of any great power or divided between several, as in the past.
As the 21st century proceeded, U.S dominance of the affairs of the "[[Middle East]]" eroded. Iran has created a politico-military sphere of influence in the [[Fertile Crescent]] (Iraq, Lebanon, [[Palestine]], Syria) and [[Yemen]] at the expense of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Despite the resurgence in Russian influence and intermittent [[French]] attempts to reassert a leading role in [[Lebanon]], regional rather than external powers began to drive politico-military rivalries and dynamics there. China is displacing other [[great power]]s as the region's largest economic partner, but the Middle East is no longer in the sphere of influence of any great power or divided between several, as in the past.
==Eurasia==
The [[United States]] and the [[European Union]] (EU) briefly challenged [[China]] and [[Russia]] for influence in post-[[Soviet]] [[Central Asia]], but it soon became obvious to them that they were at best marginal players in the region. Russia and China did not have to do much to deny them significant roles in its governance, economic development, and [[foreign relations]]. An effort by [[Turkiye]] to assert a pan-Turkic sphere of influence has yet to succeed.
In Central Asia, the newly reconstituted [[Russian Federation]] has worked out a ''de facto'' division of influence domains with China. The [[Shanghai Cooperation Organization]], provides a forum and mechanism in which the two countries can cooperate with the countries of the region to deny the region to [[Islamist]] [[extremism]], [[terrorism]], separatist movements, and [[regime change]] through "[[color revolution]]s." Meanwhile, given [[Beijing]]'s insistence on [[Treaty of Westphalia|Westphalian norms]] of non-[[intervention]], China seems content to leave military intervention in Central Asia to Russia and its partners in the Russian-sponsored [[Collective Security Treaty Organization]] (CSTO). The CSTO, which took its current form in 1999, has defined a [[military]] sphere of influence for Russia in Central Asia, where it is the universally acknowledged "first responder." Russia is ruled by [[realist]]s who recognize that they do not have the capacity to compete with Beijing in [[trade]] and [[investment]] in the lands between them, which are unlikely to be able to resist the attractions of China's huge and expanding [[market]].
Central Asia illustrates a likely global future in which worldwide and regional orders are both [[multipolar]] and multidimensional in terms of the domains they cover.
==Belt and Road Initiative==
==Belt and Road Initiative==