| | In the Indo-Pacific too, [[multipolar]]ity and multidimensionality are becoming the norm, with different [[great power]]s now engaged in competition for dominant roles in an expanding variety of [[military]], [[economic]], [[technological]], and [[political]] domains. In this region, as in others, the [[United States]] is perceived to be progressively less engaged than it was in the last century. Meanwhile, [[geographic]] proximity gives [[China]] military advantages that the United States lacks. China’s economic size gives it influence, but the rules for [[trade]] and [[investment]] are being made plurilaterally, not by China, and without participation from external powers like the United States. Politically, China currently inspires more anxiety in its neighbors than emulation. [[Japan]] remains the most trusted power to the United States in [[East Asia]] and the [[Pacific]]. Despite [[India]]'s inclusion in the concept of the '[[Indo-Pacific]]' [[geopolitical]] zone, it remains largely sidelined. | | In the Indo-Pacific too, [[multipolar]]ity and multidimensionality are becoming the norm, with different [[great power]]s now engaged in competition for dominant roles in an expanding variety of [[military]], [[economic]], [[technological]], and [[political]] domains. In this region, as in others, the [[United States]] is perceived to be progressively less engaged than it was in the last century. Meanwhile, [[geographic]] proximity gives [[China]] military advantages that the United States lacks. China’s economic size gives it influence, but the rules for [[trade]] and [[investment]] are being made plurilaterally, not by China, and without participation from external powers like the United States. Politically, China currently inspires more anxiety in its neighbors than emulation. [[Japan]] remains the most trusted power to the United States in [[East Asia]] and the [[Pacific]]. Despite [[India]]'s inclusion in the concept of the '[[Indo-Pacific]]' [[geopolitical]] zone, it remains largely sidelined. |