But a combination of [[liberal triumphalism]] and [[ADHD|attention deficit]] [[diplomacy]] derived from resource-intensive "[[forever wars]]" and [[counterterrorism]] campaigns deprived the United States of any [[strategy]] for crafting a cooperative relationship with the newly reemerged [[Russian Federation]]. Instead, the traditional [[Western alliance|Western]] view of Russia as a latent enemy prevailed. Under pressure from [[Moscow]]'s [[Russophobic]] neighbors and their American [[diaspora]]s, a [[Military-industrial complex|military-industrial-congressional complex]] disoriented by enemy deprivation syndrome, diehard veterans of the Cold War, and force of habit, fear of Russia remained the guiding spirit of [[NATO]]. | But a combination of [[liberal triumphalism]] and [[ADHD|attention deficit]] [[diplomacy]] derived from resource-intensive "[[forever wars]]" and [[counterterrorism]] campaigns deprived the United States of any [[strategy]] for crafting a cooperative relationship with the newly reemerged [[Russian Federation]]. Instead, the traditional [[Western alliance|Western]] view of Russia as a latent enemy prevailed. Under pressure from [[Moscow]]'s [[Russophobic]] neighbors and their American [[diaspora]]s, a [[Military-industrial complex|military-industrial-congressional complex]] disoriented by enemy deprivation syndrome, diehard veterans of the Cold War, and force of habit, fear of Russia remained the guiding spirit of [[NATO]]. |